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ABSTRACT
Global estimates suggest that more than 100 million non-human animals are used for
scientific purposes each year. The nature of the research, teaching, and testing conducted on
these animals can be very invasive, painful, and fatal. Should we care? To discontinue these
practices in some cases may result in human suffering. Should any human benefits of research,
teaching, and testing outweigh the resultant animal suffering? This paper begins with an analysis
of some of the most popular theories on the moral status of animals. From this analysis it is
argued that mere species membership is not a morally relevant characteristic, and that nonhuman animals can have moral status and moral rights. A deontological approach to adjudicating
moral claims across species is presented to overcome some of the challenges typical of utilitarian
and rights-based approaches. This approach is used to sketch a general framework for evaluating
which types of scientific animal use ought to be permitted. It is argued further that, while some
forms of scientific animal use may be permitted at present, we ought to strive for the elimination
of the practice. The focus will then shift to an analysis of Canada’s regulatory system for the
scientific use of animals, identifying shortcomings of this system. The Canadian approach to
regulation in this area will be compared against approaches that are taken in the UK and the
Netherlands which are more closely aligned with the moral arguments made in the first section.
There are opportunities for Canada to learn from these countries, and remarks will be made on
how and why Canada should improve the regulation of animals in research, teaching, and testing.
Such changes have the potential to improve the wellbeing not only of the animals used in
science, but for humans as well. Finally, expected costs and benefits that would accompany the
implementation of the recommendations are considered with comments on how costs can be
alleviated and why they should be incurred.
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CHAPTER 1
MORALITY AND THE SCIENTIFIC ANIMAL USE INDUSTRY
Introduction
Non-human animal use in science constitutes a large industry. More than four and a half
million animals were used for scientific purposes in Canada in 2019, and global estimates
suggest more than 100 million animals are used annually.1 Considering the size of the industry
and the generally invasive nature of scientific animal procedures, scientific inquiry can be
expected to generate a great deal of pain and distress in non-human animals making it an area of
great moral concern. The role of policy in providing protection for animals in science is crucial
to uphold ethical standards, but these efforts often encounter significant barriers. Political action
is increasingly important as evidence continually suggests scientific, economic, and
environmental benefits are associated with transitioning to non-animal methods in science. To
meet our moral obligations to animals used in science, improve the quality of scientific inquiry,
better utilize scientific resources, and reduce environmentally harmful practices, Canada should
seek to eliminate the use of animals in science.
To begin this analysis of the scientific animal use industry, the moral status of nonhuman animals will be evaluated. I will then discuss how we ought to determine our moral duties
to other animals in light of their moral status, with a specific focus on animals used in science. A
case-by-case approach for evaluating scientific animal use will be proposed arguing for the
immediate abolishment of some practices and a gradual transition away from others. Next, an

1. Canadian Council on Animal Care (CCAC), CCAC Animal Data Report 2019, 4; Katy Taylor et al., “Estimates for
Worldwide Laboratory Animal Use in 2005,” ATLA 36, no. 2 (July 2007): 328-36; Andrew Knight, “127 Million Nonhuman Vertebrates Used Worldwide for Scientific Purposes in 2005,” ATLA 36, no. 5 (July 2008): 494-5.
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overview of the scientific animal use industry in Canada will be provided along with an analysis
of the regulations that surround this industry and how they are enforced. The Canadian
regulatory system will then be compared with other countries that enforce stronger regulations
on scientific animal use, specifically The UK and The Netherlands. Recommendations will be
made for how Canada should learn from these countries to develop stronger, more effective
regulations. Finally, economic impacts that would be expected to follow the adoption of these
recommendations will be analyzed, along with considerations of environmental impacts that
would accompany changing practices in the scientific animal use industry.
Morality & Non-Human Animals
Scientific procedures conducted on non-human animals in Canada are classified based on
the degree of pain and distress that they inflict. Procedures range from involving little or no pain
or distress, to inflicting severe or intolerable pain on conscious, unanesthetized animals.2
Considering the use of millions of non-human animals in these procedures each year in Canada
and the substantial size of the global scientific animal use industry, scientific animal procedures
constitute a substantial source of pain and suffering and generate significant ethical concern. In
order to properly determine the ethical implications of scientific animal procedures and the moral
obligations that humans have to the animals used in these procedures, it must first be determined
to what extent non-human animals are deserving of moral consideration. To do this, some of the
most prominent positions on the moral status of non-human animals will be considered.3

2. CCAC, CCAC Animal Data Report 2019, 6.
3. Unless otherwise stated, the discussion of non-human animals will generally refer to animals as defined by
the scientific animal use industry. It is not accepted that this definition is appropriately broad – indeed I will argue
that the definition should be expanded – but the scope of the term will be limited herein to avoid metaphysical
complications regarding what is an animal.
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i. Speciesism
In her article, The Moral Status of Animals, Lori Gruen presents an in-depth discussion of
the moral considerability of non-human animals.4 The first position that she analyzes is
“speciesism” – the idea that humans are the only morally considerable beings or that their
interests are of higher importance than those of other species based merely on species
membership.5 Peter Singer has compared this position to racism. A speciesist human views the
interests of humans as more important than the interests of other species based merely on species
membership, similar to how a racist person might view the interests of his own race as more
important than the interests of another race based merely on race membership.6 Gruen rightly
holds that the species to which one belongs is a characteristic that is not, in itself, morally
relevant. Thus, species membership is not a suitable basis for determining the moral
considerability of entities.7 Mary Anne Warren comes to a similar conclusion in her article,
Moral Status, claiming that we do not have good reason to believe that non-human animals are
incapable of being morally considerable based on their species, while overlooking any cognitive
capacities they possess.8
ii. Human Exceptionalism
The next position that Gruen discusses is that of “human exceptionalism,” explained as
the view that there are capacities possessed exclusively by humans which serve as the basis for

4. Lori Gruen, “The Moral Status of Animals,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017).
5. Interests, in this section and throughout the paper, are defined as the needs and desires of living, sensible
creatures which, when satisfied, contribute to the flourishing of that being and, when frustrated, make that being
worse off. Interests are not restricted to the reflective activity of taking an interest in something. For Gruen’s
discussion of speciesism, see: Gruen, “The Moral Status of Animals,” 1.1.
6. Peter Singer, “All Animals are Equal,” Philosophic Exchange 5, no. 1 (1974): 108.
7. Gruen, “The Moral Status of Animals,” 1.1.
8. Mary Anne Warren, “Moral Status,” in A Companion to Applied Ethics, eds. R.G. Frey, C.H. Wellman (WileyBlackwell, 2003), 441.
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affording moral status to humans and not to other animals.9 This position goes a step beyond
speciesism by suggesting that it is not species membership in itself that sets us apart from the
other animals, morally speaking, but that there is some uniquely human characteristic(s) that
serve as the basis for having moral status. A challenge with this approach is to identify the
capacities that afford moral considerability to all humans, but not to any other beings. Various
capacities that have been suggested, Gruen explains, have all failed to be exclusive to humans.
The cognition and behaviour of humans are said to share “deep roots” with those of other
animals.10 Due to a lack of capacities that have successfully been identified as uniquely human,
and the cognitive and behavioural similarities between humans and other animals, Gruen claims
that the attempt to identify capacities that are uniquely human is not a strong approach for
determining the moral considerability of animals.11
Rationality has been suggested as a capacity that sets humans apart from other animals.
Gruen provides an example of this in her writing when she considers “personhood,” understood
in the Kantian sense that the criteria for being a person is to be a rational, self-reflective being.12
This concept has been further developed by Christine Korsgaard who has suggested that the
“beliefs” of non-human animals are simply their perceptions, and their “wills” are simply their
desires. “Conscious activities” occur in non-human animals, but they are not “conscious of
them.”13 Alternatively, Korsgaard holds, humans are conscious of and think about their
perceptions and desires. This level of consciousness, Korsgaard explains, allows humans to

9. Gruen, “The Moral Status of Animals,” 1.2.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 1.3; Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, eds. Mary Gregor, Jens Timmermann
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 428; Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,
eds. R.B Louden, Manfred Kuehn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 15.
13. Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 93.
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question whether certain perceptions constitute a reason to hold a belief, and whether certain
desires constitute a reason to act. She argues that the “reflective mind” requires a reason;
perception and desire are not enough. This “problem of the normative,” as Korsgaard refers to it,
is considered unique to humans, separating them from the other animals.14
Gruen identifies an important problem that results from Korsgaard’s line of reasoning:
Some humans do not fit within the category of persons. There are humans, such as infants and
people with severe cognitive impairments, who do not possess the capacities for rationality and
self-reflection that constitute this understanding of personhood.15 Korsgaard addresses this
problem by suggesting that, even though there is a significant difference between rational, selfreflective beings and those that lack these capacities, both are deserving of moral consideration,
including non-human animals.16 She dissents from Kant’s view that moral demands can only be
made by moral beings, arguing instead that non-moral beings can make moral demands against
moral beings. She claims that there are many morally considerable “natural concerns,” such as
the desire to be free of pain, that do not arise from our rational capacities but from our “animal
nature.”17 To exemplify this, Korsgaard states that we already believe it is wrong to make an
animal suffer if we recognize our own suffering, which arises from our animal nature, as morally
objectionable. While our rational capacities allow us to value ourselves as ends in ourselves, our
animal nature is included in what we value and, so, should also be valued in other animals.18 This

14. Ibid.
15. Gruen, “The Moral Status of Animals,” 1.3.1.
16. Mary Anne Warren has further supported this idea, arguing that suffering is intrinsically evil whether it is a
human or a non-human animal that suffers. She claims that if we are unable to recognize this, then we will be
unable to properly understand why certain ways of acting toward other humans are morally reprehensible. See:
Mary Anne Warren, “The Rights of the Nonhuman World,” in Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of Readings,
eds. Robert Elliott, Arran Gare (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1983), 114; Christine M. Korsgaard, “Facing
the Animal you See in the Mirror,” The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2009): 7.
17. Korsgaard, “Facing the Animal you See in the Mirror,” 7.
18. Korsgaard, “Facing the Animal you See in the Mirror,” 7-8.
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position overcomes the implausible claim that rationality and self-reflection are the only morally
significant capacities by viewing them, rather, as members of a larger class of morally significant
capacities. In line with this assertion, Gruen concludes that the needs and desires that are valued
by rational, self-reflective agents should also be valued when non-rational beings experience
those needs and desires similarly.19 This, in essence, is the principle of equal consideration of
like interests which I will discuss shortly.
iii. Sentience
The final basis for determining moral status that Gruen discusses is sentience. She
acknowledges in this section that the lives of sentient beings, human and non-human, can be
made better or worse.20 The position maintained by utilitarians is that the issue of real
importance to beings is whether their interests are satisfied or frustrated. Contemporary
utilitarians, Gruen explains, argue that the capacity of a being to suffer is sufficient for that being
to be deserving of moral consideration. Any being that possesses an interest in avoiding suffering
is deserving of that interest being considered. A being, human or non-human, that acts in a way
to avoid pain can be viewed as having the interest of avoiding suffering. Gruen concludes that
beings capable of suffering are deserving of moral consideration and can make moral claims.21

19. Gruen suggests that rational, self-reflective agents have interests that are not a matter of their rational,
self-reflective capacities, but of their existence as living, sensible creatures. Thus, these types of interests should
be valued the same way in all living, sensible creatures that have the capacity to experience those same interests.
(It should be further noted that this is not a comprehensive way of identifying the interests of non-human animals,
as these animals may have interests that rational, self-reflective agents do not.) See: Gruen, “The Moral Status of
Animals,” 1.3.1.
20. Ibid., 1.4.
21. Gruen suggests that non-human animals make moral claims on us when we recognize that they are in pain.
(This should be extended to recognize the ability of rational agents to make moral claims on behalf of non-rational
beings, as there may be cases of suffering in non-rational beings that are not evident to rational agents. In these
cases, rational agents can make claims on behalf of the non-rational beings.) See: Gruen, “The Moral Status of
Animals,” 1.4.
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The view above understands suffering as having moral significance, which raises an
interesting question regarding when suffering is moral suffering. Under some views, suffering by
itself is not morally significant but must be instituted as such by an observer who pities the
sufferer. In this way, attributing moral status is a characteristic of moral agents. However, this
characteristic does not license moral agents to rank themselves higher than other beings in terms
of moral significance. Just as moral agents are entitled to grant their own moral status by way of
their desire to avoid suffering, so must they grant moral status to other beings who have a desire
to avoid suffering.
Other views may understand suffering as intrinsically bad and would regard all cases of
suffering as moral suffering. For example, Jeff McMahan has discussed the idea that there are at
least two bases for a being’s moral status – the being matters in itself, or it provides a physical
location where intrinsically bad states, such as suffering, can occur.22 Under this type of view, a
being’s suffering has moral status regardless of whether a moral agent is present to observe and
pity the suffering. Additionally, the intrinsic badness of suffering would suggest that suffering in
itself has the same moral status (varying as a matter of degree) regardless of the species of being
in which it occurs.
To illustrate an interesting difference between the two types of views just discussed,
consider the following example. There are two planets, Acheron and Elysium, both of which are
inhabited by a rich population of sentient beings, though none of them are moral agents nor are
any moral agents aware of the existence of these planets. Life on Acheron is characterized by a
fierce competition of interests and a great deal of suffering. Life on Elysium, however, is

22. Jeff McMahan, “Suffering and Moral Status,” forthcoming in Rethinking Moral Status, ed. Stephen Clarke
and Julian Savulescu (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2-4.
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characterized by complete harmony of interests and very little suffering. According to the first
type of view discussed – that suffering is only moral suffering if it is instituted as such by an
observer who can conceive of morality and pity the sufferer – life on Acheron might be more
painful than life on Elysium, but it would not be worse, morally speaking. The second type of
view, which recognizes suffering as having moral status in itself, would suggest that life on
Elysium is, indeed, better than life on Acheron. Another way of thinking about this difference is
that the first view would suggest that a world with less suffering can be better than a world with
more suffering only if there is a moral agent present to perceive and pity the suffering. The
second view grants that a world with less suffering is always better than a world with more
suffering, other things equal. The fundamental question is whether morality is a construct of
moral agents, or if it exists independently and is merely discovered by moral agents. While these
views are interesting and relevant to the discussion of moral suffering, I cannot offer a resolution
to their opposition, nor is such a resolution required to continue with the aim of this paper.
Regardless of the differences between the two views discussed above, each holds that
suffering is morally significant in the eyes of a moral agent. They also do not justify hierarchies
of ethical importance on the basis of species membership – either all beings capable of suffering
can make moral claims against moral agents based on their suffering, or none can. The reasoning
in this subsection is consistent with the idea in the previous subsection that the possession of
rational capacities is not a necessary condition for having morally considerable interests. For
example, it seems highly plausible to say that the pain inflicted through torturing an infant would
be sufficient to make the act morally reprehensible, despite the infant’s lack of rationality. There
is no good reason to deny similar moral considerability to non-human animals that are also
capable of suffering. Thus, the capacity of a sentient being to suffer, regardless of rational

8

capacity or species membership, is sufficient for a moral agent to afford moral consideration to
that being.
iv. Utilitarianism and Rights-Based Theories
Following her analysis of the moral considerability of non-human animals, Gruen
explains that identifying non-human animals as morally considerable does not indicate how to
assess their moral claims or how to adjudicate a conflict of claims. She discusses two different
approaches that aim to provide guidance for navigating these issues. One of these positions is a
utilitarian position. According to this position, the significance of an animal’s moral claim
depends on the existence of competing moral claims. The harms and benefits associated with
each claim are evaluated and the proper course of action is the one that maximizes utility by
minimizing overall harms and maximizing overall benefits. Following from the arguments above
on species membership and moral status, species membership is not a morally relevant capacity
that alters the weight of a being’s moral claim, and so a harm or benefit that is experienced
similarly in both a human and another animal is not stronger in the human on the basis of species
membership. Singer has addressed this in his discussion of the principle of equal consideration of
like interests. Under this principle, any roughly similar cases of suffering must be weighed
equally regardless of the species to which the suffering beings belong.23 To provide an example
under the utilitarian position, if the life of a morally considerable being is threatened and the only
way to save its life is to harm another morally considerable being without killing it, then it may
be viewed as morally permissible to inflict such harm.24

23. Peter Singer, “Equality for Animals?” in Practical Ethics, by Peter Singer (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), 57.
24. Gruen, “The Moral Status of Animals,” 2.
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Gruen suggests the adoption of a “multi-factor perspective” to reconcile some of the
objections to the utilitarian position, such as that egregious harms could potentially be permitted
if they were accompanied by a large enough amount of relatively trivial benefits, even if these
benefits are spread across a large group such that no one individual receives any substantial
benefit. The multi-factor perspective involves consideration for the types of interests a being is
capable of possessing, the relative weight of interests, and the context of the interests and the
beings who hold them. Gruen presents the idea of interests existing on a scale, being either
crucial, important, replaceable, or trivial. In a conflict of interests, more important interests
override less important ones.25 Despite the attempt to overcome objections by adopting these
approaches, the utilitarian perspective still faces challenges. For example, it seems that a singular
crucial interest would override any number of important interests, but it is not clear that
important interests should not be able to weigh against crucial ones to some degree. Perhaps a
considerable number of important interests within one individual should aggregate to constitute
consideration in the crucial category, and what if there is a tremendous amount of important
interests spread across a large group? Further challenges arise with the categories. It is not clear
which types of interests belong in each category and where the lines are drawn between them. If
there are conflicting interests within the same category of importance, then the view may depend
on the simple balance of harms and benefits again. Even under the multi-factor perspective,
utilitarianism seems to commit us to do wrong under some circumstances. Consider a popular
thought experiment originally presented by Judith Jarvis Thomson.26 You are a surgeon with five
patients who will all die if they do not receive organ transplants today. Another patient in your
clinic happens to have the right blood-type and all of the healthy organs needed such that

25. Ibid.
26. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Trolley Problem,” The Yale Law Journal 94, no.6 (May 1985): 1396.
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harvesting his organs would allow you to complete all five of the organ transplants, and you
know all of the transplants will be successful. Are you permitted to harvest the one patient’s
organs against his will in order to save the lives of the other five patients? While it seems
morally intuitive that you are not permitted to kill the innocent patient to save the other five, the
utilitarian position would suggest you ought to do this.
The other position Gruen discusses is the animal rights approach. There are variations of
this approach, some stronger than others. Consider Tom Regan’s rights approach first as an
example of a strong animal rights approach, followed by Warren’s weak animal rights approach.
According to Regan, any being, human or otherwise, that experiences pleasure and pain, joy and
suffering, satisfaction and frustration – any being whose quality of life, as experienced by them,
is made different by these – is a “subject-of-a-life” with inherent value and moral rights.27 Any
violation of those rights, such as performing experiments on animals, is morally reprehensible
regardless of the needs of humans or other animals.28 He makes an exception to this by claiming
that we can override the rights of others only if they are violating our rights, suggesting we could
seriously harm or kill a terrorist if doing so is a justifiable means of preventing the rights
violation they will perform.29 Regan defines a subject-of-a-life as “a conscious creature having
an individual welfare that has importance to [itself] whatever [its] usefulness to others.”30 In
determining which non-human animals fit within this category he focuses on their subjective
experience, a capacity which he associates with the central nervous system in humans. Due to the
similarities between the human central nervous system and those of other mammals, Regan

27. Tom Regan, “The Case for Animal Rights,” in In Defence of Animals, ed. Peter Singer (New York: Basil
Blackwell, 1985), 24.
28. Gruen, “The Moral Status of Animals,” 2.
29. Tom Regan, “Empty Cages: Animal Rights and Vivisection,” in Animal Ethics: Past and Present Perspectives,
ed. Evangelos D. Protopapadakis (Berlin: Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH, 2012), 183.
30. Regan, “The Case for Animal Rights,” 22.
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suggests that humans and non-human mammals are equally subjects-of-a-life. As such, he claims
that these beings hold certain moral rights equally, specifically focusing on rights to life and
bodily integrity, and violating the rights of such beings cannot be morally justified.31
Warren has concerns with Regan’s position. Perhaps the most critical issue she raises is
the existence of a “sharp line” – an all-or-nothing divide between those beings who matter
morally and those who do not based on whether they are the subject-of-a-life. According to
Regan’s theory this sharp line must exist somewhere, while Warren argues that it is more likely
for subjective experience to vary as a matter of degree. She discusses such animals as fish,
amphibians, reptiles, and invertebrates as examples where the all-or-nothing approach seems
poorly suited – even if these animals are not considered subjects-of-a-life, perhaps they still have
some level of subjectivity that is morally significant.32 Warren presents an alternative to Regan’s
position that she identifies as the weak animal rights theory. This theory suggests that beings
should be free to pursue their natural interests free from the infliction of unnecessary harms, but
that the strength of their moral rights may vary based on probable degrees of sentience and
mental capacities.33 She suggests that the latter is relevant to the strength of moral rights as
beings with greater mental capacities are likely to have a greater capacity for suffering.34 Warren
also claims that humans have stronger rights than other animals due to human rationality
permitting cooperation and problem solving, which she suggests may require complex language
like that of human language.35

31. Tom Regan, “Empty Cages: Animal Rights and Vivisection,” 183.
32. Mary Anne Warren, “Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position,” Between the Species 2, no.4
(1986): 165-6.
33. Warren, “Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position,” 172.
34. Warren, “Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position,” 166.
35. Warren, “Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position,” 169.
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Warren draws attention to a crucial problem in Regan’s theory – the all-or-nothing
divide. Another challenge with his position lies in the suffering that it ignores. Under Regan’s
position, morality demands that all testing and experimentation that violates the rights of any
subject-of-a-life must be stopped immediately. This would result in the end of many, if not all,
uses of animals in tests and experiments. Considering the use of animals in medical studies and
safety testing,36 the immediate abolishment of these studies could result in a significant amount
of suffering and death among beings that rely on medications required to undergo animal safety
testing, and many areas of medical research would be slowed or stopped until non-animal
methods could be developed. However, under Regan’s view, the suffering of those with medical
conditions and those who are reliant on medication do not constitute a moral justification for
continuing to violate the rights of non-human animals through testing and experimentation. It is
not clear that we should accept Regan’s claim that the suffering of others should not be
considered as a potential justification for overriding the rights of an individual. Perhaps, at least
in some cases, there could be enough suffering at stake to justify some overriding of rights.
Warren’s weak animal rights theory effectively responds to the challenges in Regan’s
theory. She eliminates the all-or-nothing moral divide, allowing more non-human animals to
receive moral consideration without requiring that their rights be equal in strength with the rights
of all other morally considerable beings. Her claim that rights can vary in strength presents the
possibility for rights to be weighed against one another which is more informative for evaluating
conflicting moral claims than is Regan’s view of rights as being inviolable. Warren’s claim that
human rights are stronger than the rights of other animals on the basis of rationality, however,

36. More than 1.4 million animals were documented as being used in medical studies, and over 200,000 in
regulatory testing in Canada in 2019. CCAC, CCAC Animal Data Report 2019, 5.
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seems problematic. This claim is subject to the same challenges raised previously in the section
on human exceptionalism. Primarily, it does not seem that the rational human ability to cooperate
and resolve conflicts should increase the relative weight of all of our rights, even those that are
grounded in non-rational capacities. Additionally, her claim that cooperation and conflict
resolution may require something like human language seems troublingly anthropocentric –
perhaps other animals can achieve cooperation and conflict resolution with language that is
considerably different from human language. The elements of Warren’s weak animal rights
theory are strong, though her claim about human rights being categorically stronger than those of
other animals is weak.37
v. Adjudicating Competing Moral Claims: Moderate Deontology
The bases for determining the moral status of non-human animals that were considered at
the beginning of this section – speciesism, human exceptionalism, and sentience – fail to provide
any satisfactory arguments that justify granting hierarchies of ethical importance on the basis of
species membership. Suffering of a certain degree ought to make the same moral claim against a
moral agent regardless of the type of being that experiences the suffering. Additionally, beings
capable of experiencing the same degree of suffering have the same moral rights to avoid that
suffering. Moral rights are not understood here in the sense of absolute or inviolable rights, as in
Regan’s rights position. Rather, to say that a being has a moral right is to recognize that they
ought to be treated a certain way. For example, to say that humans have a moral right to life is to
say that we ought not to kill them – doing so would be morally impermissible. However, there

37. Utilitarian and rights-based approaches to adjudicating moral claims have been contrasted here to
emphasize the differences in how they generally proceed and common issues that they encounter. There are
variations to the approaches taken in each category such that the two categories and their relation to one another
are more nuanced than what is presented herein.
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could be competing considerations that, if considerable enough, could justify overriding a
person’s right to life – this will be discussed later. Based on what has been established, it would
be inconsistent to suggest that moral rights apply to all and only humans – at least some morally
considerable interests in humans, such as the interest to avoid suffering, that are at the foundation
of certain moral rights apply similarly to at least some non-human animals. In cases where nonhuman animals have morally considerable interests, we must also recognize what this tells us
about how they ought to be treated – we must recognize their moral rights. Utilitarianism and
rights-based theories face substantial challenges in their attempts to adjudicate competing moral
claims. Here, I will present a deontological framework to account for how the interests and moral
rights of non-human animals ought to be weighed against the interests and moral rights of
humans.
Deontological theories are concerned with duties and adhering to the Right, rather than
the focus on maximizing the Good that is characteristic of consequentialist theories like
utilitarianism.38 While rights have a role in moderate deontological theories, they are not the
central focus and they are not absolute. Moderate deontological theories consider our duties, how
they weigh against one another, and how they inform what are to be our moral obligations. They
include constraints against certain actions which can make an act wrong even if it produces the
most good, but the constraints are not absolute such that they can be lifted if there is enough at
stake. One such deontology has been developed by W.D. Ross. In establishing his position, Ross
contrasts it with utilitarianism. He discusses an example in which you have made a promise to a
friend to meet them for a trivial engagement, though you find yourself in a position where you

38. Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, “Deontological Ethics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(October 2020): section 2.
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can provide relief to the victims of a serious accident. Ross argues that it is justifiable to provide
aid to the victims of the accident, thus breaking the promise made to your friend, not because it
will bring about greater good as utilitarians would argue, but because the duty to help the victims
is stronger than the duty to keep your promise. To support his position, Ross considers an
instance of this scenario in which the good brought about by either option – keeping your
promise to your friend or providing relief to the accident victims – will be equal. While classical
utilitarianism would suggest you may flip a coin as either option is equally permissible, Ross’
position holds that we ought to provide relief to the accident victims on the basis of the relative
strength of our duties in this scenario.39
The example discussed above illustrates Ross’ ideas of prima facie duties and duty
proper. He does not use “prima facie” to refer to a potentially illusory appearance at first sight,
rather he speaks of prima facie duties as those which would constitute our duty proper in the
absence of other prima facie duties.40 Our duty proper is our duty all things considered – that
which outweighs any conflicting duties and which we ought to uphold.41 In the example above,
your duty to keep your promise and your duty of benevolence to provide relief to the accident
victims are prima facie duties – either one would be your duty proper in the absence of other
such duties. Taking both into consideration, the duty of benevolence is stronger than the duty to
keep your promise and so becomes your duty proper. Thomas Hurka and Esther Shubert have
provided an analogy with opposing physical forces that helps to illuminate this idea of weighing
prima facie duties to determine our duty proper. When opposing forces act upon the same object

39. W.D. Ross, “What Makes Right Acts Right?” in The Right and the Good, ed. Philip Stratton-Lake (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 18.
40 Ross, “What Makes Right Acts Right?” 19-20.
41 Ross, “What Makes Right Acts Right?” 19-20.
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it is the stronger force that determines the direction in which the object is moved. Similarly,
when we have opposing prima facie duties it is the stronger duty that determines the proper
direction of our actions and our duty proper.42
While Ross’ deontology emphasizes weighing prima facie duties against one another to
determine our duty proper, his position does little to enlighten how it is that we ought to conduct
this weighing. Philippa Foot has discussed a distinction that helps to illuminate how we ought to
weigh the prima facie duty to provide aid against the prima facie duty not to cause harm. The
distinction she discusses is that between doing and allowing. Foot asserts that it is morally worse
to actively do harm to another than to allow them to be harmed. She argues this point on the
basis that actively doing harm involves setting a new chain of events in motion that will bring
about harm whereas allowing harm to occur involves permitting a chain of events to continue
when it is already in motion or will soon be in motion.43 Relating this to the organ transplant
example discussed previously, the surgeon’s duty not to cause harm to the one healthy patient is
stronger than her duty to provide aid to those who need organ transplants. While her duty not to
cause harm applies only to one person and her duty to provide aid applies to five, this is not
enough to justify the infliction of harm on the healthy patient. Foot’s position suggests this is
because actively inflicting harm is more severely wrong than allowing harm to occur such that
the prima facie duty not to cause harm to one outweighs the prima facie duty to provide aid to
five, making the surgeon’s duty proper to refrain from killing the healthy patient. An interesting
question arises from this weighing of prima facie duties – might there be a number of patients

42 Thomas Hurka and Esther Shubert, “Permissions To Do Less Than the Best: A Moving Band,” in Oxford
Studies in Normative Ethics, ed. Mark Timmons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 7.
43 Philippa Foot, “Morality, Action, and Outcome,” in Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 89-90.
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who could be saved that is large enough such that the duty to provide aid outweighs the duty not
to cause harm, granting the surgeon a permission or even an obligation to kill the one healthy
patient? Moderate deontology suggests there could be enough at stake in some scenarios to lift
the constraint against killing the healthy patient. How many people must stand to be saved –
would saving 100 lives be enough to justify killing one person, or would it need to be a thousand
or even a million? Samantha Brennan has explored this topic with her discussion of thresholds
for rights.
Brennan’s thresholds approach is quasi-consequentialist. It shares some elements of
consequentialist theories like utilitarianism – specifically, Brennan’s approach looks at the
overall good produced or harm prevented in consideration of whether a course of action is
morally permissible. However, her approach has important variations from consequentialist
theories such that it is not based on a simple one-to-one weighing of harms and benefits. There
are three central elements to Brennan’s approach which distinguish it from other consequentialist
theories. The first element is what she calls the total requirement. This is the amount that must
be at stake in order to justify the infringing of another’s right.44 If it is not permissible to kill one
person to save five, as is suggested in the organ transplant example, then saving five lives is not
enough to satisfy the total requirement to justify killing a person. If it is, however, permissible to
kill one person to save 100, then the total requirement would be met, and we would know that
the threshold to justify killing someone exists somewhere between saving five lives and saving
100 lives.

44. Samantha Brennan, “Thresholds for Rights,” in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 33, no.2 (Summer 1995):
147.
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A challenge with the total requirement arises when we raise the question of where,
specifically, the threshold for this requirement exists. In the organ transplant example just
discussed, moral intuition provides a general sense of where the threshold exists within a
substantial range, though it is not very informative for cases that occur somewhere in the middle
of that range. Perhaps it would still seem rather clear that we should not kill one person to save
six, or that we would be permitted to kill one person to save ninety-nine, but what should we do
if there are thirty lives at stake? If that does not seem like enough to justify killing a person,
maybe forty would do it, or perhaps we need fifty lives at stake. Moral intuition is not a precise
tool for identifying where this threshold exists, and unless a precise tool could be developed for
weighing lives against one another in cases like this, the exact location of the threshold will
remain difficult to identify, if at all possible. With this limitation on identifying the specific
location of the threshold for the total requirement, perhaps the threshold may, at best, be
identified as existing somewhere within a general range. Moral considerations would be clear for
cases that occur outside of this range, but cases that operate within the range would likely be
highly controversial with difficulties in identifying what morality permits or demands. In this
way, there are limitations on how informative the total requirement is in Brennan’s approach.
The second element Brennan discusses is the universal constraint. This element suggests
that what is at stake must satisfy a minimum level of severity to be counted against the harm that
will be inflicted. To illustrate this, she suggests that no number of minor headaches could justify
the killing of a person to prevent those headaches.45 The universal constraint, she suggests, is
relative to the harm that will be inflicted. While no number of minor headaches could justify
killing a person, she does view minor headaches as being severe enough to be factored into the

45. Brennan, “Thresholds for Rights,” 149.
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consideration of whether it is permissible to punch a person in the nose.46 While Brennan does
not have a clear guideline on where this constraint ought to be placed in relation to the harm that
will be inflicted – making this threshold susceptible to the same type of challenge with precision
as the total requirement, – the idea is that it rules out the possibility that a great deal of minor
considerations could achieve the total requirement and justify inflicting a major harm. Some
concerns arise with this constraint. Brennan suggests that numerous minor considerations in one
person at different times ought to be considered independently rather than aggregately. For
example, she says that one person experiencing two headaches at two different times should be
viewed the same as two different people each experiencing one headache.47 What if a person
experiences a headache every day for the rest of their life, should we view this as no different
than thousands of different people each experiencing one headache? It seems that having a
headache every day for the remainder of your life is a more severe type of harm.
The final element Brennan discusses is the existential constraint. This element requires
that at least one beneficiary of the harm that will be inflicted has at least as much at stake as the
person who stands to be harmed.48 This element is perhaps the most questionable. Brennan gives
an example of inflicting the harm of losing an arm to prevent others from losing their fingers.
She suggests that, no matter how many people stand to lose their fingers, it would not be
justifiable to cause the person to lose an arm unless there is also a beneficiary who stands to
suffer a harm that is as bad or worse than losing an arm.49 From her previous comments viewing
two headaches occurring in one person the same as two people each experiencing one headache,

46. Brennan, “Thresholds for Rights,” 152.
47. Brennan, “Thresholds for Rights,” 152.
48. Brennan, “Thresholds for Rights,” 153.
49. Brennan, “Thresholds for Rights,” 153.
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it seems she would not view one person losing ten fingers as worse than ten people each losing
one finger. As such, to lose ten fingers would still be a less severe harm than losing an arm.
Already this seems questionable, and it becomes even more so when we consider that, according
to this view, we would not be permitted to cause a person to lose an arm if doing so would
prevent everyone in the world from losing all of their fingers.
Consider the following diagrams, the one on the left providing a general visualization of
Brennan’s thresholds approach and the one on the right providing an example of how it might
look when weighing the loss of fingers and arms.
Loss of an arm
and 100 fingers

Total Requirement

Cost to
person A

Existential
Constraint

Loss of
an arm

Universal
Constraint

Loss of an arm
Loss of a finger

While there are some concerns with Brennan’s thresholds approach, particularly with precision
and with the suitability of the existential constraint, it sketches a general framework that is
valuable for thinking about how to weigh our duties against one another to determine our
permissions and obligations. This framework, I argue, can incorporate our duties to non-human
animals who can make moral claims on us, and these can be weighed against the duties we have
to humans. Based on the arguments raised throughout, there are no fundamental differences
between our duties to humans and our duties to other animals that would preclude the latter from
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being captured within this framework. Rather, any differences in the duties that we have to
different beings would be captured by placing them at different points on the scales in the
diagrams above. While the information we can expect to receive from engaging in this practice
of weighing our duties to humans and to other animals will not be precise – due to issues with
identifying exact locations of thresholds, – incorporating our duties to non-human animals within
Brennan’s thresholds approach is proposed as a framework for getting a general sense of how we
can weigh these duties against one another in a way that overcomes some of the challenges with
other utilitarian and rights-based theories.
vi. Thresholds and Scientific Animal Use
In moral considerations it seems that harms are more significant than benefits.50 If giving
candy to a person brings about a benefit that is equal in magnitude to the harm brought about by
giving a person a minor headache, it does not seem that we should flip a coin to decide between
giving someone a piece of candy or preventing a minor headache. Rather, the harm seems to
have more significance and we should choose to prevent the minor headache. Consider the
following table, presented to me by Thomas Hurka, and the subsequent explanation.51
In order to prevent harm

In order to give benefits

to others

to others

Causing harm to someone

5

6

Failing to prevent a harm

3

4

Failing to give a benefit

1

2

50. Jeff McMahan has discussed the idea that the ability of a good to weigh against a harm depends on
whether the good is in the form of preventing a harm or providing an enhancement, suggesting the latter would
have less weight. See: Jeff McMahan, “Proportionate Defence,” in Weighing Lives in War, ed. Jens David Ohlin,
Larry May, and Claire Finkelstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 152.
51. Thomas Hurka presented this table in an Ethics lecture on January 13, 2020, at the University of Toronto.
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The scenarios depicted in this table are increasingly difficult to justify, number one being the
least difficult to justify and number six being the most difficult. There may be some dispute with
the rankings, particularly in the middle – perhaps four is actually more difficult to justify than
five. The rankings would also likely fluctuate based on the types of harms and benefits involved
in different scenarios. Generally speaking, if we keep the harms and benefits in question the
same for each scenario, the difficulty of justifying the scenarios follows this kind of trend (you
might insert a harm and benefit to help illuminate this, perhaps using the benefit of receiving
candy and the harm of a minor headache mentioned above). The reason for this trend can be
explained with the doing versus allowing distinction discussed by Foot, and the greater moral
significance of harms over benefits. In the column at the left of the table, the top entry – causing
harm to others – is a case of actively inflicting harm. The next entry below is a case of allowing a
harm to occur – according to the doing versus allowing distinction, this latter case would be less
severely wrong. Finally, the bottom entry in the leftmost column involves allowing a benefit not
to be received which is even less severely wrong than the previous entry, morally speaking, due
to the lesser significance of benefits compared to harms. The actions are more severely wrong as
they move up the table making them more difficult to justify. Looking at the row across the top
of the table, the first entry involves prevention of harms whereas the next entry to the right
involves giving benefits. Again, based on the greater moral significance of harms over benefits,
an act is more difficult to justify if it produces benefits rather than preventing harms, making the
scenarios more difficult to justify as they move to the right of the table.
Another distinction that has been proposed as a factor in how difficult it is to justify
inflicting a harm is the distinction between eliminative and opportunistic harm. Jonathan Quong
has identified eliminative harms as those inflicted on another person in an act that could have
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been achieved without the other person being present, whereas opportunistic harms are those
inflicted on another person through an act that could not have been achieved without the other
person being present. Quong argues that opportunistic harming is considerably worse than
eliminative harming.52 This distinction seems to draw on relations to a chain of events, similar to
Foot’s distinction between doing harm and allowing harm to occur. Consider the organ transplant
example discussed previously. To kill the healthy patient in order to save the five other patients
would be a case of opportunistic harming – the act of saving five lives could not be achieved if
the healthy patient were not present. In this case, you are bringing the healthy patient into a chain
of events to which they are not intimately connected. Now, consider a variation of the organ
transplant example. Your five patients need organ transplants immediately – thankfully, the
organs will be arriving any minute by helicopter. As the helicopter approaches, the pilot notices
there is a person trapped on the landing pad who can be moved, but it will take some time to get
them free. The pilot has no place else to land and will certainly kill the trapped person if they
land on the pad. The time required to free the person from the landing pad is so long that waiting
means the five patients will die before they can receive their new organs. If the pilot lands on the
trapped person and kills them, this is a case of eliminative harming – the person is already
intimately connected to the chain of events that will result in their death. The pilot does not
require that the person is on the landing pad – and she would likely prefer if they were not
involved in the chain of events in this way – but she cannot avoid this. While it may not be clear
whether it is permissible for the pilot to land, killing the trapped person, it certainly seems that, if
it is wrong, it would be less severely wrong than killing the healthy patient in the original

52. Jonathan Quong, “Killing in Self-Defense,” Ethics 119, no.3 (April 2009): 530.
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example. In other words, when the same amount is at stake, opportunistic harming is more
severely wrong and, thus, more difficult to justify than eliminative harming.
Cases of scientific animal use are mostly, if not entirely, cases of scenarios five and six
from the table above making them perhaps the most difficult to justify from these possible
scenarios. Taking the distinction of eliminative and opportunistic harm into consideration makes
cases of scientific animal use even more difficult to justify as such cases usually, if not always,
involve opportunistic harming. It is not as if the procedures being conducted could have taken
place if the animal subjects were absent – rather, these practices depend on the presence of the
animals, bringing them into a chain of events which they would not otherwise be involved in and
which causes them harm. Further harms associated with scientific animal use can be identified
when looking at the lack of suitability for human applications and the comparable benefits of
non-animal technologies.53 The substantial thresholds for justifying the infliction of these
considerable harms must be recognized.
When looking at Brennan’s thresholds approach, increasing the difficulty of justification
would raise the total requirement of impartial good that is necessary to lift constraints and permit
one to incur the associated cost. However, as the costs in these scenarios would be imposed on
non-human animals, we are faced with the question of how to weigh those costs against the
corresponding human harms and benefits. The principle of equal consideration of like interests
suggests we ought to treat roughly equal cases similarly – the harm of losing a leg might be
viewed as roughly equal in a human and a dog in terms of the physical pain that is suffered.
However, there are also elements in this example that seem relevantly dissimilar – the loss of a

53. This topic is discussed in more detail in the final section of chapter 2 and the first section of chapter 3.
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leg may be much more physically (and, perhaps, mentally) debilitating for the human than the
dog. In another example, Singer has suggested that cancer may be a greater harm in humans than
in mice due to the evidence that humans have a higher degree of awareness about what it means
for them to have cancer.54 Warren and Martha Nussbaum have made arguments that relate to this
topic as well. Warren has suggested that higher mental capacity generates a higher capacity to
suffer.55 Nussbaum has argued that the same condition across two species may not constitute the
same level of harm in each – she gives an example of a human and a chimpanzee each having a
level of cognitive capacity equal to the average level for a chimpanzee. While the human may
experience social and political barriers that make it difficult to achieve full and equal
participation in their society, the chimpanzee would not experience any such harms.56 We might
also consider, however, that humans tend to have greater resources to alleviate the harms they
experience. From prosthetics to painkillers and psychological supports, humans tend to have
more aide available to address the harms we experience than other animals. Could these factors
offset some relevant differences between humans and other animals, or even make the harms of
non-human animals more substantial in some cases due to a lack of therapeutic options?
The weighing of harms between humans and non-human animals is a complex and
imperfect procedure, even without mentioning the harm of death which further complicates the
matter. However, for the sake of the argument to follow, a precise weighing of such harms will
not be necessary. The general framework provided by Brennan, when applied to certain cases of
scientific animal use, is quite informative. For example, the use of nonhuman animals for testing

54. Singer, “Equality for Animals?” 58-9.
55. Warren, “Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position,” 166.
56. Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Moral Status of Animals,” The Chronicles of Higher Education 52, no. 22
(February 2006).
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of cosmetics and household products is clearly unjustifiable. These practices are instances of
case six from the table above which sets the highest threshold for justifying the imposed harms.
There is not enough at stake for humans such that the existential constraint would be met, and,
more importantly, the benefits afforded to humans would not satisfy the universal constraint. In
other words, what is at stake for humans in these contexts is not severe enough to count toward
justifying the harms inflicted on non-human animals. Moreover, there are many cosmetics and
household products available that do not employ animal testing such that any loss of benefits to
humans if testing in these areas were eliminated would be minimal, if even existent. In these
cases, and any similar ones, the use of animals ought to be eliminated immediately.
Other cases are far more complex, particularly when the scientific use of animals aims to
prevent substantial harms such as in cases of research on life-threatening disease. Weighing of
harms in these cases would be challenging even with access to information about the procedures
and conditions that non-human animals are exposed to, though the public does not have access to
such information in Canada. My intuition is that, even in cases where considerable human harms
stand to be prevented, the infliction of harms on non-human animals in scientific procedures
would not be permissible in most cases. This seems particularly plausible if we consider the low
likelihood that successful findings in animal trials will translate to success in human trials, which
will be discussed later. However, I will not provide an argument about moral permissibility in
such instances. Rather, for these complex cases my position is that we ought to phase out the use
of animals in science where harms are inflicted whether their use is deemed permissible or not.
For any cases where scientific animal use is morally impermissible, we would have an obligation
to eliminate their use. If there are cases of scientific animal use where it is determined that the
total prevention of harm expected to result from a course of action outweighs the infliction of

27

harms on non-human animals such that it is deemed morally permissible, we should still aim to
phase out the use of animals. While moderate deontology does not require this systematically,
my reasoning rests on two points. First is the commonly held principle that a world with less
suffering is better than a world with more suffering. Developing alternative technologies that
replace scientific use of animals would alleviate a great deal of suffering without prolonging or
incurring greater harms to humans. The second point relates to Ross’ discussion of compunction.
If we are permitted or obligated not to fulfill a prima facie duty in order to fulfill our duty proper,
Ross argues that our unfulfilled prima facie duties still exist. While our leaving them unfulfilled
is justified, he says we ought to feel a sense of compunction and that we have a duty to try to
make up for this.57 In all cases of scientific animal use, even if they are justified, our duty not to
cause harm is unfulfilled. Rather than accepting an institution that systematically overrides the
rights of other beings not to be harmed, we would be better to transition to an approach that
achieves the same ends without requiring that we leave our duty not to cause harm unfulfilled.
There are some cases where the value of scientific animal use is clearly not enough to
justify overriding the rights of other beings not to be harmed. These cases, such as testing of
cosmetics and household products, ought to be eliminated immediately. There are many cases
that have far more crucial aims to prevent human harms and it is often unclear whether there is
enough at stake to justify the scientific use of animals. Even if my intuition is correct and many
of these cases are morally impermissible, their complexity makes it difficult to definitively
establish such a normative claim. Further, establishing a convincing argument for the moral
impermissibility of such practices may be unlikely to influence the operations of the industry –
we might view factory farming as an example of this as a practice that is responsible for far more

57. Ross, “What Makes Right Acts Right?” 28.
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animal suffering and environmental degradation than scientific animal use, though the institution
seems largely unaffected by ethical argumentation. Rather than trying to establish an argument
about the moral permissibility of complex, high-stakes cases of scientific animal use, my focus is
on promoting the phasing out of scientific animal use altogether to eliminate a practice that is
responsible for a great deal of suffering and that systematically requires us to leave unfulfilled
our duty not to cause harm.
The Argument for a Gradual Transition
Why should a gradual transition away from scientific animal use be permitted? First, it is
not suggested that all uses of animals in science should be phased out gradually. A case-by-case
approach should be taken to determine which procedures are clearly unjustifiable and should be
eliminated immediately, and which are more complex and should be phased out gradually.
Practices such as cosmetic testing and dissections in secondary school should be eliminated
immediately due to being of trivial value that cannot justify the associated uses of animals.
However, there are potential cases where the immediate abolishment of animal procedures may
cause substantially more suffering than would occur if they are allowed to be phased out. Such
cases may include safety testing of medical products and pharmaceuticals that many people
depend on to avoid suffering or death and for which non-animal methods to perform the required
safety tests are not available.
Second, and unfortunately, moral arguments are not always sufficient for producing
social and political change. In the case of slavery, campaigning for abolition was important for
denouncing the practice and influencing moral attitudes, but it is largely accepted that abolition
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also depended on slavery becoming less economically efficient.58 Advocating for abolition of
scientific animal procedures will similarly continue to have an important role in changing moral
attitudes, but there is also a need to develop systemic changes that make the practice less
economically favourable and that make elimination of the practice more politically viable. The
political and economic barriers to immediately abolishing the practice make this approach
unlikely to be adopted, and, in some cases, morality might suggest that immediate abolishment
would be suboptimal or even impermissible. Thus, it is believed that permitting a gradual
approach in certain areas of the industry, in combination with continually advocating for
elimination of the practice, will contribute to a faster progression toward a complete and morally
justified abolishment of the practice.
The Animals in Scientific Animal Use
The discussion thus far has largely focused on the moral considerability of animal
suffering and how to weigh harms and duties. With increasing numbers of animals used to
achieve a goal and increasing severity of harms imposed on them it becomes more difficult to
justify the goals of scientific animal use. This section will provide some information on the
number of animals used for scientific purposes in Canada and the severity of harms to which
they are exposed.
First, refer to table 1 below for a depiction of the types of animals used in Canadian
studies in 2019.59

58. In making a comparison between slavery and scientific animal use, there is an important distinction I ought
to make: In the case of scientific animal use I have suggested there may be some instances where the practice is
justified. However, in the case of slavery, I am not suggesting that the practice has had potentially justifiable
instances. See; Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011): 253.
59. CCAC, CCAC Animal Data Report 2019, 4.
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Animal Type

Number of Animals

Mice

1,391,398

Birds

1,194,320

Fish

905,822

Cattle

632,060

Rats

176,024

Amphibians

115,093

Other Animals

44,610

Pigs

33,072

Guinea Pigs

20,426

Other Rodents

13,609

Dogs

12,195

Reptiles

7,925

Cats

5,894

Rabbits

5,269

Nonhuman primates

4,805

Total

4,562,522

Table 1: Animals Used for scientific purposes in Canada in 2019.

Although there is some vagueness in this list, we can see that most of the animals listed are
vertebrates. Warren draws attention to the high probability that vertebrate animals have the
capacity to experience mental states such as pain and pleasure based on their behaviour,
neuroanatomy, and sensory organs.60 Additionally, the National Research Council (US)
Committee on Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory Animals has concluded that all
vertebrate animals should be considered to have the capacity to experience pain.61 Under the

60. Warren, “Moral Status,” 442.
61. This position is based on two points: (i) there is believed to be a strong likelihood that it is correct, and (ii)
the consequences of wrongly assuming that a vertebrate cannot experience pain has “serious ethical implications.”
See: National Research Council (US) Committee on Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory Animals,
Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory Animals (Washington: National Academies Press, 2009): 23.
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definition of animal used by the Canadian Council on Animal Care (CCAC), it is known that any
invertebrate animals recorded in table 1 are cephalopods.62 Mather and Anderson provide
evidence that these types of animals exhibit physiological and behavioural responses that are
consistent with the human experience of pain.63 Thus, there is good reason to believe that all of
the types of animals listed in table 1 have an interest in avoiding pain and can suffer.
Second, consider the following categories of invasiveness for animal studies as set out by
the CCAC, and the number of animals involved in each category as shown in table 2 below.64
Category B: Experiments which cause little or no discomfort or stress.
Category C: Experiments which cause minor stress or pain of short duration.
Category D: Experiments which cause moderate to severe distress or discomfort.
Category E: Procedures which cause severe pain near, at, or above the pain tolerance
threshold of unanesthetized conscious animals.
Category of Invasiveness

Number of Animals

B

2,134,957

C

1,207,785

D

1,249,683

E

152,892

Total

4,745,317

Table 2: Animals Used in Each Category of Invasiveness in 2019.65
62. “Animals” are defined as “vertebrates and cephalopods.” See CCAC, “What Types of Animals Are Studied in
Canadian Science?” www.ccac.ca.
63. They also discuss the importance of cephalopods having an environment that allows them to exercise their
natural behaviours, referring to the negative impacts of frustrating these behaviours that have resulted from
confinement in aquaria. See: Jennifer A. Mather and Roland C. Anderson, “Ethics and invertebrates: a cephalopod
perspective,” Diseases of Aquatic Organisms 75, no. 2 (May 2007): 121-5.
64. CCAC, CCAC Animal Data Report 2019, 6.
65. The total number in this table exceeds the total number of animals reported in table 1 due to some
individual animals being used in multiple procedures. See: CCAC, CCAC Animal Data Report 2019, 7.
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Categories C, D, and E, by definition, involve inflicting harms upon non-human animals. There
is a possibility that some experiments in category B could be conducted without inflicting harm.
In addition to the experiments conducted on non-human animals, the conditions in which
they are confined must be considered. Rachels has outlined various ways that confinement has
been harmful to captive animals, concluding that an animal’s environment must be sufficient for
that animal to engage in its natural behaviours if its interests are not to be harmed.66
Additionally, there is strong evidence to support that at least some animals, including rats, fish,
and primates, have social interests that impact their welfare.67 Thus, failure to provide the
animals with adequate environments to accommodate their natural behaviours and satisfy their
social interests could constitute harm as well.
Alternatives Options: Invertebrates, Live Isolates, Computer Models, and Others
Alternatives to scientific animal use will be important to phase out, and ultimately
eliminate, the use of animals in science. This section aims to provide information on the types,
applications, and availability of such alternatives.
Invertebrate organisms are used in a wide variety of laboratory applications, including
medical studies on Parkinson’s disease, diabetes, and drug development.68 The extent to which
invertebrates are used in animal research in Canada is difficult to approximate, as invertebrates

66. James Rachels, “Do Animals Have Rights?” in Can Ethics Provide Answers? (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
1997), 85-8.
67. Tanja K. Kleinhappel et al., “Animal welfare: a social networks perspective,” Science Progress 99, no. 1
(2016): 68-82; Oliver Burman et al., “Removing individual rats affects indicators of welfare in the remaining group
members,” Physiology & Behaviour 93, no. 1 (2007): 89-96; Ana I. Faustino et al., “Mechanisms of social buffering
of fear in zebrafish,” Scientific Reports 7, no. 1 (March 2007): 1-10; Brenda McCowan et al., “Connections Matter:
Social Networks and Lifespan Health in Primate Translational Models,” Frontiers in Psychology 7 (April 2016): 1-11.
68. Sonali K. Doke and Shashikant C. Dhawale, “Alternatives to animal testing: A review,” Saudi Pharmaceutical
Journal 23, no. 3 (July 2015): 226-7; Susan E. Wilson-Sanders, “Invertebrate Models for Biomedical Research,
Testing, and Education,” ILAR 52, no. 2 (January 2011): 127-8.
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only fit within the CCAC definition of an “animal” if they are cephalopods. Scientific procedures
involving non-cephalopod invertebrates fall under a distinct category of invasiveness, “Category
A: Experiments on most invertebrates or on live isolates.”69 Since they are not regarded as
animals by the CCAC, the scientific uses of non-cephalopod invertebrates are not monitored and
no animals are reported in this category.70
Invertebrates are commonly regarded as having a reduced capacity or inability to suffer,
generally due to their simple physiology relative to “higher” animals.71 However, there is
evidence that various invertebrates exhibit physiological and behavioural responses to noxious
mechanical, thermal, and chemical stimuli.72 It is possible that invertebrates have less capacity to
suffer than do vertebrate animals, but it is not clear that they are incapable of suffering. If the
assumption is wrong, serious ethical implications arise from acting under the assumption that
invertebrates cannot suffer. Unless it can be definitively shown that invertebrates are incapable
of suffering, we should assume that they can suffer and treat them accordingly. In her article
investigating the capacity of invertebrates to experience pain, Jane Smith makes a suggestion that
should serve as a guide for the use of invertebrate animals in scientific procedures. That is, the
conditions of invertebrate research should seek to reduce any pain and stress that the animals
could potentially experience, any killing should follow humane procedures, and the animals’
living conditions should be the most appropriate for their kind.73 Invertebrates should be

69. CCAC, CCAC Animal Data Report 2017, 6.
70. CCAC, CCAC Animal Data Report 2017, 6-7.
71. C.M. Sherwin, “Can Invertebrates Suffer? Or, How Robust is Argument-by-Analogy?” Animal Welfare 10, no.
1 (February 2001): 103.
72. Jane A. Smith, “A Question of Pain in Invertebrates,” ILAR 33, no. 1-2 (January 1991): 26-28; Paul L.R.
Andrews, “Laboratory Invertebrates: Only Spineless, or Spineless and Painless?” ILAR 52, no. 2 (January 2011): 1214; Mather and Anderson, “Ethics and invertebrates: a cephalopod perspective,” 121.
73. Smith, “A Question of Pain in Invertebrates,” 30.
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included in the classification of “animals,” regulated more closely, and ultimately replaced in
research by non-animal alternatives.
The use of in vitro methods involving live isolates, such as cell and tissue cultures, may
be a promising alternative to animal studies. In vitro methods have been utilized to study areas
such as safety pharmacology, genotoxicity, eye and skin irritation, and dermal absorption.74
These methods have the potential to reduce or replace some forms of animal testing, possibly
providing faster and higher quality data.75 One challenge with in vitro methods is that they
sometimes involve collecting cells and tissues from animals through invasive procedures that
may inflict harm.76 In vitro studies can reduce the number of animals needed for research as cell
and tissue cultures can be used for various purposes over an extended period, making it an
improvement over conducting research directly on animal subjects, but there should also be
development to eliminate the need for invasive collection methods.77 In vitro methods also
include the use of cells and tissues from human sources allowing the collection process to
involve consent, and providing better models in research that is conducted for human
applications.78
Computer models have been developed to simulate human physiology to aid in the
development of new medicines, predict various potential toxic and biological effects of

74. Jen-Yin Goh et al., “Development and use of in vitro alternatives to animal testing by the pharmaceutical
industry 1980 – 2013,” Toxicology Research 4, no. 5 (August 2015): 1301.
75. Ibid., 1297; R.M. Pearson, “In-vitro techniques: can they replace animal testing?” Human Reproduction 1,
no. 8 (December 1986): 559.
76. PREDICT One Health Consortium, PREDICT Operating Procedures: Rodent Sampling Methods (2017), 6-16;
PREDICT One Health Consortium, PREDICT Operating Procedures: Livestock Sampling Methods (2016), 5-11;
Karolinska Institutet, “On tissue collection from mice and rats” (December 2014), www.ki.se.
77. Doke and Dhawale, “Alternatives to animal testing: A review,” 226.
78. Jan Barfoot et al., Stem Cell Research: Trends and Perspectives on the Evolving International Landscape
(Elsevier, 2013), 25; Wyss Institute, “Human Organs-on-Chips,” wyss.harvard.edu.
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substances such as chemicals or new drugs being developed, and contribute to the understanding
of human biology.79 Using computer models can accelerate processes in medical research, such
as the development of new drugs, compared to the conventional animal methods.80 Beyond their
value in medical research, computer models have applications in educational settings along with
other types of models and virtual learning tools. There are extensive non-animal resources that
seek to educate at all levels of schooling without the use of animals.81 The use of these
educational tools as alternatives to animal methods has been associated with an equal or higher
level of academic performance, faster learning, and better understanding among students
compared to others who engaged in animal methods.82 There may be areas of professional
training in which the current non-animal alternative methods are not able to provide the same
level of preparation as conventional animal methods, requiring further innovation to make
transition away from animal methods possible.83 However, in many educational settings, and
particularly in the case of dissections, there is good reason to believe that computer models and
other non-animal educational resources provide equal or higher quality of education than
conventional animal methods. These latter methods should be replaced by the former

79. Baltazar D. Aguda et al., “An In Silico Modeling Approach to Understanding the Dynamics of Sarcoidosis,”
PLOS One 6, no. 5 (May 2011): 1-9; Ted Martonen et al., “In silico modeling of asthma,” Advanced Drug Delivery
Reviews 55, no. 7 (July 2003): 829-49; Doke and Dhawale, “Alternatives to animal testing: A review,” 225.
80. National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering, “Computational modeling” (2016),
www.nibib.nih.gov.
81. The Science Bank offers computer models and other tools that can replace the use of animals in educational
settings from the earliest years of primary school to medical and veterinary school. See: The Science Bank,
“Innovative Teaching Tools for Today’s Science Class,” www.thesciencebank.org.
82. D.G. Dewhurst et al., “Comparison of a computer simulation program and a traditional practical laboratory
class for teaching the principles of intestinal absorption,” Advances in Physiology Education 267, no. 6 (December
1994): S103; Dinesh K. Badyal et al., “Computer simulation models are implementable as replacements for animal
experiments,” ATLA 37, no. 2 (April 2009): 192; Jonathan Balcombe, “Dissection: The Scientific Case for
Alternatives,” Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science 4, no. 2 (2001): 120; National Anti-Vivisection Society,
“Animals Used in Education,” www.navs.org.
83. Netherlands National Committee for the protection of animals used for scientific purposes (NCad),
Transition to non-animal research (2016): 4.
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accordingly.84 The continued development and implementation of computer models will help to
replace animal procedures and can improve the quality and efficiency of medical research and
education.
CHAPTER 2
COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF SCIENTIFIC ANIMAL USE POLICY
Canadian Regulations on Scientific Animal Use
Various non-animal methods are already viable to replace uses of animals in science in
such areas as cosmetics testing and dissections, and there are promising progressions with in
vitro and computer models that seek to replace the use of animals in more crucial areas.
However, there will undoubtedly be some areas of animal studies, the benefits of which are
deemed crucial, that will not have any viable non-animal alternatives readily available. In the
cases where the use of animals in science will continue until they can be replaced by non-animal
alternatives, it is important to minimize the harm inflicted on animals by improving the quality of
conditions that the animals are exposed to and the care that they receive. This section will look at
the systems in Canada that seek to regulate scientific animal use and how they relate to the moral
considerations discussed above.
Who has regulatory power over the conditions and levels of care to which animals in
science are subjected? Animal welfare was not included in the Constitution Act, 1867, and
neither were medical or scientific research. Considering the status of non-human animals as

84. In various countries, including The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Argentina, dissections are no longer
carried out in primary or secondary schools, and the quality of scientific education has not suffered. (The same
approach should be adopted in Canada immediately.) See: Balcombe, “Dissection: The Scientific Case for
Alternatives,” 124.
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property under Canadian law, the power over animal welfare has fallen under the provincial
power of Property and Civil Rights.85 Research institutes typically fall under the provincial
power of Local Works and Undertakings.86 Thus, regulatory power over the use of animals in
science largely belongs to the provinces. The degree of regulation on scientific uses of animals
within provinces is minimal, if there is any regulation at all.87 However, the federal government
has also been able to exercise some authority over animal welfare through Criminal Law power.
Further influence has involved the use of federal “spending power” to fund the Canadian Council
on Animal Care (CCAC), mandating compliance with the standards of this organization as a
requirement for receiving federal research grants.
i. The Canadian Council on Animal Care
The CCAC is a Canadian body that regulates the use of animals in science at the national
level. The organization was developed in 1968, following a decade of growth in biomedical
research and changing attitudes on the ethics of scientific animal use.88 Though not a government
institution, they are funded by two agencies of the federal government.89 In 2017 and 2018 the
CCAC received approximately two-thirds of its funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health
Research (CIHR) and Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC).90 The
CCAC has developed extensive general guidelines for the care of animals focusing on areas such

85. The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s. 92(13); Elaine L. Hughes, “Scientific Experiments on Animals
and Constitutional Principle,” Constitutional Forum 12, no. 1-3 (July 2011): 71.
86. The Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(10); Elaine L. Hughes, “Scientific Experiments on Animals and
Constitutional Principle,” Constitutional Forum 12, no. 1-3 (July 2011): 71.
87. Hughes, “Scientific Experiments on Animals and Constitutional Principle,” 72-3.
88. CCAC, “When – A Timeline of Animal Ethics and Care in Canadian Science,” www.ccac.ca.
89. Charlotte Montgomery, Blood Relations: Animals, Humans, and Politics (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2000),
96.
90. The total combined amount granted from these two agencies was 1.75 million dollars each year. See: CCAC,
Financial Report 2017-2018, 2. www.ccac.ca.
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as environment, nutrition, social and behavioural requirements, surgery, anesthesia, and
euthanasia.91 They have also developed guidelines specific to different types of animals to
provide protections that are better tailored to the animals’ needs.92 Laboratory inspections are
conducted to assess whether facilities adhere to the guidelines of the CCAC.
How well does the CCAC regulate scientific animal use to be aligned with the moral
considerations discussed above? At first glance, the oversight from the CCAC seems to be an
effective way to monitor the use of animals in science and ensure that appropriate measures are
taken to minimize harm. However, under this regulatory system there exists no harm-benefit
analysis of any kind that would employ the types of weighing discussed in Brennan’s threshold
approach. The CCAC also does not recognize a need to phase out the use of animals in science,
rather defending the continuation of the practice. Further, the organization faces numerous
barriers (discussed below) that significantly constrain the abilities of the CCAC to enforce
regulations and reduce harm inflicted upon animals used in science.
First, participation in the CCAC program is not mandatory. Participation is required in
order to receive public funding, thus requiring the participation of government institutions and
other facilities that depend on public funding. However, any private facilities, such as companies
in pharmaceuticals or biotechnology, can conduct animal procedures with no obligation to
participate in the CCAC program. As universities have been collaborating more with private
corporations on research in recent years, their need for public funding has diminished and,
subsequently, so has oversight from the CCAC.93 Dave Neil, a past veterinarian at the University
of Alberta, has suggested that the voluntary structure of the CCAC has led to systems in most

91. CCAC, “General Guidelines,” www.ccac.ca.
92. CCAC, “Types of Animals,” www.ccac.ca.
93. Lesli Bisgould, Animals and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011), 210.
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provinces under which private institutions can conduct animal studies with a complete absence
of oversight and limitations so long as they are not blatantly and criminally cruel.94
Second, the members of the CCAC do not constitute a well-rounded representation of
competing interests in the area of animal use in science. There are twenty-two member
organizations, most of which have an interest in encouraging or conducting animal procedures.
Humane Canada is the only member with a clear interest in animal welfare.95 The distribution of
interests among the Board of Directors also underrepresents the interests of non-human animals.
There are currently twelve directors, three of whom have legal, business, or accounting
backgrounds. Of the other nine directors, six are directly involved in medical or academic
research and two others have backgrounds as veterinarians in animal research contexts. There is
only one director who has a clear background in advocating for animal welfare.96
Third, inspections conducted at CCAC-certified facilities do not effectively enforce
CCAC guidelines. Inspections are conducted once every three-to-five years and the facilities
receive significant notice, allowing them to prepare for the inspection.97 During inspections,
members of the inspection panel – made up of scientists, a minimum of one veterinarian, and one
community member nominated by Humane Canada – receive information about the procedures
being conducted at the facility. This includes information on how many animals are being used,
the types of animals being used, and the conditions to which they are being subjected.98
Inspection panels do not typically get to observe experiments in-progress.99 After the inspection,

94. Montgomery, Blood Relations, 103.
95. CCAC, “Member Organizations and Funders,” www.ccac.ca; Bisgould, Animals and the Law, 209.
96. CCAC, “Board of Directors,” www.ccac.ca.
97. Bisgould, Animals and the Law, 211; Montgomery, Blood Relations, 96.
98. Ibid., 97.
99. Bisgould, Animals and the Law, 211.
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the panel produces a written report and submits this to the facility within ten weeks. The facility
is expected to respond to the concerns outlined in this report by proposing a plan for making
changes that will address the concerns. The facility has three to six months to produce this plan,
depending on the significance of the concerns. After receiving this proposed plan, the CCAC will
find the facility to be in a state of compliance, conditional compliance, probation, or noncompliance with the standards of the CCAC. If a facility is found to be in a state of noncompliance, this can be reported to government and other funding agencies. To reach this point
in the process can take up to a year, during which the facility could continue to operate without
resolving any of the concerns.100
If a CCAC-certified facility is found to be in a state of non-compliance, the CIHR and
NSERC can stop funding research in that facility. However, by the year 2000, even though
facilities had been found to be in non-compliance, funding from federal agencies had never been
stopped or reduced in response.101 In 2003, the executive director of the CCAC stated that the
program had not stopped even one experiment since it was established in 1968.102 In the past
eighteen years since this statement was made, the evidence, or lack thereof, suggests that the
power to revoke or reduce federal funding to facilities that are found to be in non-compliance
with the CCAC standards remains unexercised. The CCAC does not make this information
available.
Fourth, the availability of information through the CCAC is substantially restricted. No
information about facility assessments are released, members of the assessment panel must agree
to confidentiality, and there is no requirement for the facilities to release any information on

100. Montgomery, Blood Relations, 97.
101. Ibid.
102. John Sorenson, About Canada: Animal Rights (Black Point: Fernwood Publishing, 2010), 137.
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CCAC findings. Further, there are no details released about the conditions and procedures to
which the animals are subjected, nor are there any details released about standards violations that
are discovered, and information about which facilities are subject to assessment is not
available.103 Since the CCAC is not a federal agency, it is not included under the Access to
Information Act and has no obligation to release any of this information.104 The information that
the CCAC does release is limited to the total amount of animals that are used in CCAC-certified
facilities, the types of animals used, and how many animals are used in each general category of
invasiveness and purpose of use.105 The CCAC holds the view that this level of confidentiality is
needed to promote discussion among scientific communities, and it seems also to aim at
protecting institutions from acts of protest against their methods of animal use.106 However, as
will be discussed later, other systems of regulation have been developed that involve a higher
degree of transparency while promoting learning between scientific communities and protecting
the identities of institutions.
The information that is released by the CCAC is further restricted in the sense that it does
not capture the full scope of scientific animal use in Canada. Since private facilities in many
provinces can operate with little or no oversight and no requirement to report data on their
operations, it is nearly impossible to accurately determine how many animals are used in science
in Canada, the specific purposes for which they are used, and the procedures to which they are
subjected. Additionally, there are some animals used in science that are simply not recorded.
These include non-cephalopodic invertebrates and animals that are dead prior to their scientific

103. Bisgould, Animals and the Law, 212-13.
104. Montgomery, Blood Relations, 100; Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1.
105. Bisgould, Animals and the Law, 213.
106. Ibid., 212.
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use, such as those killed for dissection and those that die as a result of genetic modification
processes.107
Fifth, a core element of the CCAC program is that every certified animal use facility must
have their own Animal Care Committee (ACC). The ACCs are supposed to ensure adherence
with CCAC guidelines, review proposed procedures, and ensure that an effort has been made to
seek non-animal methods. There is, however, no requirement for ACCs to contribute to the
development of non-animal methods, and it is not made clear to what extent an ACC must seek
such methods. Thus, it is very difficult to enforce this requirement of seeking alternatives; the
ACCs own assurance that there are no viable non-animal methods may be sufficient.108
The CCAC does not set requirements around the types of members that make up the
ACCs, but suggest that they should include scientists or teachers that have worked with animals,
a member of the institution who does not conduct work with animals, at least one veterinarian,
and at least one community member.109 Generally these committees consist mostly of individuals
who have shared interests with the institution, and who hope to have their own proposals
approved by the ACC which creates an incentive for the committee members to approve the
proposals of the other members.110 The community members are from outside of the institution,
but depend on an invitation from the ACC to be on the committee and to remain on it.111 Further,
rejection by a community member may not have much impact on the outcome for a proposal.
Stephanie Brown, a former president of multiple humane societies, spent some time as a member
of an ACC at a hospital in Toronto. Brown rejected the proposed renewal of an experiment

107. Montgomery, Blood Relations, 101.
108. Bisgould, Animals and the Law, 211-12.
109. CCAC, “Oversight System,” www.ccac.ca.
110. Bisgould, Animals and the Law, 212.
111. Montgomery, Blood Relations, 101.
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involving the insertion of metal bars into the backs of cats causing them to be immobilized. The
committee required a single vote of rejection in order to veto a proposal. Rather than accepting
Brown’s rejection of the proposal – being the only one – the committee decided to change the
requirement to two votes of rejection in order to veto a proposal.112
Finally, approximately one-third of the CCAC’s funding comes from fees paid by the
institutions that participate in the CCAC program.113 This creates a disincentive for the CCAC to
revoke an institution’s CCAC-certification, as doing so would result in a loss of financial support
for the organization. CCAC-certified institutions have been found to be in non-compliance with
CCAC guidelines, but there is no record of the CCAC ever revoking an institution’s certification,
nor any record of federal funding having been reduced or revoked, even though these are the
proposed repercussions for an institution that is found to be in non-compliance.
The CCAC has not had any role in criticizing scientific uses of animals and has not
effectively supported the need to replace these uses. Rather, it has a history of defending the
interests of the animal research industry and supporting the use of animals in science as a
necessary practice.114 David Sztybel, in an evaluation of the CCAC’s code of ethics, has
criticized the institution as being potentially more harmful to animals used in science than if the
program did not exist at all. The CCAC creates the idea that animals in science are protected in
Canada while effectively fostering the continued suffering of these animals.115 Legislative action

112. Montgomery, Blood Relations, 103.
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114. Bisgould, Animals and the Law, 209-10.
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is urgently needed to develop a better regulatory system for the scientific uses of animals in
Canada.
ii. Criminal Law
The federal government has not enacted any legislation directly relating to the use of
animals in science. This area falls under sections 444 – 447 of the Criminal Code which protect
against cruelty to animals.116 Some shortcomings, however, include a lack of definition for the
term “animal,” and the classification of animals as property. Viewing non-human animals as
property in the legal system enforces the idea that animals should be valued merely on the basis
of the utility they offer to humans. Further, these sections of the Criminal Code provide minimal
protection to animals used in science. The anti-cruelty laws have a particular focus on violent
abuse, such as forcing animals to fight one another, and interference with animals while they are
aiding in law enforcement, military operations, or other services to humans. However, the
infliction of pain and suffering on non-human animals is generally deemed legally permissible if
it serves a lawful purpose, such as in the case of scientific procedures.117 Criminal power in
Canada has been exercised over the use of an animal in research only once in response to a study
that involved a baboon being constantly restrained in a chair for a matter of months, alone, in a
windowless room. The study had been approved by the CCAC.118
iii. Provincial Law
Animal welfare is a matter that falls under provincial power. Provincial legislation on
animal welfare typically proscribes the infliction of distress upon non-human animals. However,

116. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
117. Sorenson, About Canada: Animal Rights, 157.
118. Montgomery, Blood Relations, 62; Tim Beardsley, “Canada Baboon Cruelty Trial,” Nature 313, no. 6002
(February 1985): 421.
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if the practices that inflict distress upon animals are generally accepted – such as research,
testing, and teaching – they tend not to constitute an offence. Provincial animal welfare
legislation largely protects the use of animals in science in this way, while providing little
legislative protections for the animal subjects, if there are any protections at all.
Legislation protecting non-human animals in British Columbia is unique, being the only
provincial legislation that does not make any reference to the use of animals in science.119
Excluding Ontario, which will be discussed separately, the other eight provinces recognize the
uses of animals in science as accepted practices. The laws protecting animals in all eight of these
provinces do not apply to the accepted practices of research, testing, and teaching, so long as
these practices operate according to generally recognized guidelines, many referring specifically
to CCAC guidelines.120 However, none of the provinces require institutions that conduct animal
studies to actually participate in the CCAC program. The power to inspect these institutions is
generally delegated to certain agents within each province, typically officers from animal
protection or law enforcement agencies. These agents have the power to conduct inspections of
facilities where animals are held or where there is reason to believe that animals are in distress.
However, legislation in many of the provinces state that the use of animals in accepted practices
does not constitute distress. Hence, the use of animals in science is typically not, in itself, a
reason to believe that animals are in distress - there must be reason to believe that the procedures

119. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, RSBC 1996, c 372.
120. NL: Animal Protection Standards Regulations, NLR 36/12, s.10. AB: Animal Protection Act, RSA 2000, c A41, s.2(2); Animal Protection Regulation, Alta Reg 203/2005, s.2. MB: The Animal Care Act, CCSM c A84, s.3(2), 4,
6(2); Animal Care Regulation, Man Reg 126/98, s.4(4)-4(5). PEI: Animal Welfare Act, RSPEI 1988, c A-11.2, s.7(1)7(2). NB: Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, RSNB 1973, c S-12, s.18(1); General Regulation, NB
Reg 2000-4, Schedule A.
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being conducted violate the guidelines that are referenced in the respective legislation. It is rare
for the distress caused through an accepted practice to constitute an offence.121
Ontario, like most of the other provinces, has general policies surrounding animal cruelty
which do not apply to the use of animals in science that adhere to generally accepted
guidelines.122 However, Ontario differs from the other provinces in having legislation that
applies directly to the use of animals in science. The Animals for Research Act requires that all
facilities using animals for research purposes must be registered as approved by the director of
the act who is appointed by the Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs.123 The director
makes decisions about whether to approve an application for registration based on reports
submitted by the research facilities.124 The act also requires animal research facilities to develop
an animal care committee similar in function to those required by the CCAC.125 An inspector is
empowered under the act to monitor all registered facilities, and any other facility that is
reasonably expected to be using or intending to use animals for research purposes.126 Unlike in
the case of the CCAC where advanced notice is provided to facilities before an inspection
occurs, the inspector under the Animals for Research Act can arrive at facilities unannounced to
conduct an inspection. Facilities found to be in violation of the regulations can be ordered to
cease their operations, and violators may be subject to fines or imprisonment.127
The regulatory system of animal research facilities in Ontario seems to be more effective
than the CCAC system, but it is not without shortcomings. The animal care committees required
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126. Animals for Research Act, RSO 1990, s.18(3).
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under Ontario’s provincial legislation do not require any members from outside of the facility,
creating the opportunity for these committees to consist entirely of individuals who share the
interests of the facility and the other committee members.128 In the case of the inspector, the
Minister has the power to appoint additional inspectors as they believe to be necessary.129 Yet,
for many years there has been only a single inspector tasked with monitoring over 120
facilities.130 Thus, the inspector monitors facilities by selectively investigating works in progress,
rather than being able to extensively review the full operations of facilities. Further, the inspector
is not empowered by the act to investigate the purposes that are served by animal use procedures,
whether there are non-animal alternative methods available, or whether a procedure involves
excessive or redundant use of animals. The reports from facility inspections under Ontario law
also remain unavailable to the public. A previous inspector, Dr. Bill Holley, claimed that in
eighteen years of service there was only one occurrence of a facility being ordered to cease
operations while a hearing was conducted. He had never seen the imposition of a fine or penalty
in a case where provincial legislation had been violated. Holley has suggested that, in order for
Ontario’s regulations on animal research to be more effective, “unnecessary pain” should be
better defined, animal care committees should require scientific experts from outside of the
facility, and inspectors should be empowered to investigate the purposes of animal procedures.131
The lack of these elements may suggest an underlying attitude that facilities having the freedom
to carry out their procedures as they see fit is more important than protecting animal welfare.
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Though having serious shortcomings, the Ontario system for regulating the use of
animals in science has strengths over the other provinces and the CCAC system. Overall, the
provincial legislation across Canada does not overcome the shortcomings of the limited
regulations set out by the CCAC and the federal government.132 Canada’s legislation on the use
of animals in science needs to be improved.
Stronger Regulations: The UK
The United Kingdom is known for having some of the strictest policies on the use of
animals in science. Scientific uses of animals are regulated under the Animals (Scientific
Procedures) Act, 1986 (ASPA).133 Two simple, but important, strengths of UK legislation which
are absent in Canadian legislation are a clear definition of which animals are protected under the
legislation, and the protection of animals outside of the classification of property.134 The animal
science industry is regulated by the Home Office,135 with licensing, monitoring, and ethical
considerations being conducted at the national level.136 The strengths of this regulatory system
will be discussed below along with how they relate to the moral considerations discussed
previously, and comments will be made on how Canada can learn from the UK to become better
aligned with those moral considerations.
i. Licensing

132. The International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), in an analysis of animal cruelty legislation across
fourteen countries, has commented on Canada’s legislation as being substantially behind the legislation of the
other countries. See: IFAW, Falling Behind: An International Comparison of Canada’s Animal Cruelty Legislation
(Ottawa: IFAW, 2008): 18.
133. Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act, 1986, c. 14.
134. In the legislation, “a protected animal” is defined as “any living vertebrate other than man and any living
cephalopod.” See: Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act, 1986, preliminary.
135. A department of the central government of the UK which has a particular focus on security and crime.
136. Derek Fry, “How Different Countries Control Animal Experiments Outside Recognized Establishments,”
ALTEX (January 2012): 311.
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In the UK, unlicensed use of animals for scientific purposes is not permitted.137 There are
three different licenses that are required for animal procedures to be conducted lawfully.
Personal licenses require that those who will be conducting the procedures have been suitably
educated and trained, and that they continue to display competency in their ability to abide by the
licensing conditions and provide proper care to the animals. If no infractions occur, a review is
required to occur at least once every five years.138 Project licenses are granted or denied
following a review of the project proposal. Such proposals are submitted to the Home Office for
consideration of the project’s purpose and conditions to ensure that the number of animals and
their suffering is minimized. A “harm-benefit analysis” is also conducted to determine if the
benefits of the project are significant enough to justify the procedures.139 While it is not clear
how these analyses proceed and how closely they agree with Brennan’s thresholds approach
discussed above opposed to a more utilitarian analysis, this kind of structure is an important tool
for implementing the types of moral considerations discussed earlier. Finally, to acquire an
establishment licence, a facility must be reviewed and found capable of providing appropriate
care to animals.”140
The power to grant the above licenses belongs to the Secretary of State who receives
assistance from medical and veterinary experts who they appoint to act as inspectors.141 Under
the ASPA, the Secretary of State is not only empowered, but required to ensure that no animals
are used in scientific procedures if there are “scientifically satisfactory” methods suitable for a
project that do not involve the use of animals.142 In the event of a violation of the ASPA or of
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any license conditions, the Secretary of State can immediately suspend or revoke a license, or a
period of time to correct the violations may be granted.143
ii. Inspections
In the UK, the potential risks of each licensed facility are evaluated to determine a
minimum number of inspections that must take place. Evaluated risk factors include; how many
projects are underway, what types of procedures are involved, how many animals are involved,
what types of animals are involved, and previous trends of compliance.144 In 2018 there were
157 licensed facilities, and 653 inspections were conducted – an average of more than four
inspections per facility within that year.145 These inspections can be conducted without providing
any notice to the facilities or the associated personnel.146 Sixty-three per cent of the inspections
conducted in 2018 were unannounced inspections.147 Having an effective framework for
inspections, such as this, is an important element for ensuring that the moral principles guiding
scientific animal use are upheld in practice.
iii. Transparency
All scientific projects that involve the use of animals are made public. Summaries of
every animal project that gets approved is published on the UK government’s website, and these
summaries are required to be free of technical terminology to make them more accessible to the
public.148 For any and all cases where personnel, projects, or facilities are found to be in non-
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compliance, descriptions of these occurrences and their outcomes are made publicly available in
annual reports released by the Home Office. In cases where more substantial investigations
occur, detailed reports are typically published to the government website. A decision to withhold
the publication of such a report is not prohibited, but would be an uncommon exception.149 These
publications function, in part, to continually educate members of the scientific community on
how to uphold the requirements of the ASPA by providing examples of violations.150 All of the
information made publicly available is disconnected from the associated facilities and personnel,
allowing for transparency about the operations of the industry while protecting industry members
from targeted protest.
Canada and the UK: A Comparative Analysis
Protections for animals in science in the UK are stronger than in Canada. A key
difference is the harm-benefit analysis in the UK which sets a foundation for a Brennan-type
weighing of duties to determine what is permissible in the field of scientific animal use.
Additionally, scientific animal procedures can only be conducted by licensed personnel who are
working on licensed projects in a licensed facility in the UK, while the Canadian system is
susceptible to having facilities, projects, and personnel that are completely unregulated. It is an
offence in the UK to conduct procedures on animals where non-animal alternatives are available,
and the availability of alternatives is subject to review. In Canada, the requirements for using
non-animal methods under the CCAC system lack a meaningful review process. Inspections in
the UK are largely unannounced and occur very frequently relative to the inspections occurring
every three to five years in Canada which involve advanced notice. Finally, the conditions

149. ASRU, Annual Report 2016, 32, 36-48; Home Office, “Animal testing: compliance investigations by the
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imposed on the animal subjects and any violations of standards are made publicly available in
the UK, while the Canadian system remains clouded by secrecy with nearly no information being
available to the public. These strengths of the UK system not only create a foundation for
conducting a Brennan-type weighing of duties, they also provide a structure for more effectively
upholding the moral demands that are identified. Nonetheless, the public opinion on matters of
animal studies seem to be similar between the two countries.151 If public attitudes are similar,
what explains the significant regulatory differences? A common approach to analyzing policy
development involves considering the political influence of institutions, ideas, and interests.
Investigating these elements will help to explain the regulatory differences between Canada and
the UK.
i. Institutions
The legislative institutions of Canada and the UK are rather similar, both being
parliamentary democracies consisting of two houses. The lower house, the House of Commons,
operates similarly in both systems. The upper houses, the Senate in Canada and the House of
Lords in the UK, are more divergent in that the Senate has become largely ineffective in Canada
while the House of Lords has a more active role in the legislative processes of the UK. Thus,
passing bills is likely to be more difficult in the UK, having an upper house that engages more
strongly in considering and challenging proposed bills than is the case in the Canadian system.

151. Survey data suggest that the use of animals in medical research is supported by 64% cent of the Canadian
public and 65% of the UK public. Views that the value of scientific inquiry is more important than animal suffering
in all cases of animal studies are supported by only 30% of the Canadian public and 39% of the UK public. See:
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Public attitudes to animal research in 2016 (Ipsos MORI,
2016), 4; CCAC, National Nanos survey 2013, 4-5.
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One of the strengths of the UK regulatory system, the high degree of transparency, is
relatively new. A directive imposed by the European Union (EU) in 2010, Directive 2010/63/EU,
required EU Member States to publish project summaries for all approved projects involving the
use of animals for scientific purposes.152 When the directive was implemented, the UK’s
regulations on scientific uses of animals were already stronger than those required by the
directive in many ways. However, the UK had not previously released summaries of the
approved projects, which has contributed an important element of transparency to the UK
system.153 Directive 2010/63/EU was implemented following a proposal that was devised in
collaboration with a wide range of societal members to gauge attitudes and perceived priorities
regarding scientific animal use.154 There has been no Canadian collaboration of this magnitude
conducted to comprehensively determine Canadian attitudes and perceived priorities regarding
how animals are used in science.
Another important institution, the European Centre for the Validation of Alternative
Methods (ECVAM), was created in 1991.155 The first such system in Canada was established in
2017 – the Canadian Centre for Alternatives to Animal Methods (CCAAM) and its subsidiary,
the Canadian Centre for the Validation of Alternative Methods (CaCVAM).156 Having an
organization to promote the benefits and viability of non-animal methods of scientific inquiry in
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Europe has likely influenced public attitudes on the value of these methods and has surely
contributed to their implementation. The development of an institution of this kind in Canada is
an important step in transitioning away from using animals in science and will likely contribute
to changing views on the perceived necessity of animal use in scientific fields.
ii. Ideas
There has been a relation between changing attitudes in times of influential academic
publications and changing regulations in Canada and the UK. In their 1959 publication, The
Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, W.M.S. Russell and R.L. Burch introduced an
idea that has come to be known as the Three Rs in the field of animal studies.157 The Three Rs
refer to replacement, reduction, and refinement.158 This idea has been influential, becoming
incorporated into many regulatory systems governing the scientific use of animals, including
those of Canada and the UK.159 The Three Rs seem to have been particularly influential in
Canada. In an account of their history, the CCAC refers to the 1950s and 1960s as a period of
changing opinions on animal ethics. Four years after the publication by Russell and Burch, the
National Research Council of Canada initiated an investigation of the conditions of care for
animals in science. In 1966, a recommendation was made for the development of a voluntary
oversight system, leading to the establishment of the CCAC in 1968.160 The regulations of the
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UK were not impacted during this time, perhaps due to having an already established system for
regulating the use of animals in science, whereas no such system existed in Canada prior to 1968.
Despite comparatively little influence in the UK during the 1950s and 1960s, the changes
made to the UK legislation in 1986 with the introduction of the ASPA were accompanied by
further academic publications and changing attitudes. The publications of Animal Liberation
from Peter Singer in 1975, and The Case for Animal Rights from Tom Regan in 1983 are
considered to have had a significant impact on the development of animal ethics as topics in
philosophy and bioethics.161 There was some legislative action in Canada around this time as
well with the implementation of the Animals for Research Act in Ontario in 1990. Academic
publications and changing opinions seem to be important for bringing attention to the regulations
around animal use, but these factors do not provide an explanation of why the systems developed
in considerably different ways.
The transparency of scientific animal use industries seems to be connected to the type of
regulatory system that is pursued when changing attitudes bring about a perceived need for
regulatory change. These industries have largely operated very privately, keeping the public and
government officials largely unaware of their operations. However, this has not been so much the
case in the UK with the early development of legislation during a time of greater transparency
around the use of animals in science.162 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, leading up to
the implementation of The Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876, Great Britain experienced shifting
attitudes toward the use of animals in science. There was very little secrecy around the practice,
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with procedures being performed for the public. Richard Ryder provides a thorough account of
the types of demonstrations practiced during this period, such as public vivisection performed on
unanesthetized dogs who were nailed to boards.163 This period was largely associated with the
denouncement of animal experiments and led to the organization of animal advocacy
organizations, animal welfare legislation throughout the nineteenth century, and the UK’s first
national legislation on animal research in 1876.164 In more recent years, prior to the
implementation of the ASPA in 1986, there was less systemic transparency, but various incidents
came to the public’s attention. In 1975 photos emerged of a study that involved forcing dogs to
smoke tobacco, resulting in widespread protest to the study.165 In 1985, the Royal College of
Surgeons was charged with cruelty, found guilty, and fined due to their treatment of monkeys
that were being used in experimentation.166
In other countries, such as Canada, where there are high levels of secrecy and a lack of
long-standing legislation on animal research, there has been a particular trend for regulations to
emerge after events that make the public more aware of the operations of the industry.167 As
previously discussed, charges of cruelty were laid against researchers at the University of
Western Ontario in 1985 for confining a baboon to a chair for a matter of consecutive months.
Within five years, the Animals for Research Act was implemented in Ontario. However, when
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the Canadian government saw a need to develop a regulatory system in the 1960s to keep up
with changing ethical attitudes, the public remained largely unaware of the scientific uses of
animals due to a high degree of secrecy and a lack of controversial procedures becoming
apparent to the public. The structure of the resulting system, the CCAC, is considerably nonstrict compared to the UK regulatory system. It seems, then, that when changing attitudes lead to
a perceived need to update regulations on the use of animals in science, public awareness of
controversial procedures tends to apply pressure for stronger regulatory responses.
iii. Interests
Interests of the public are not the only politically significant interests. In 1998, following
the emergence of the field of animal ethics and changing attitudes on the ethics of using animals
in science, the Canadian government found it necessary to update the anti-cruelty laws in the
Criminal Code which were most recently revised in the mid-1970s.168 The Canadian Department
of Justice published a consultation paper in 1998 to gather input from the public regarding the
types of change that should be made.169 Over the following ten years, thirteen different
amendments were proposed with only the thirteenth being passed. The earlier bills involved
substantial amendments, such as removing animals from the classification of property. These
bills were met with strong support from organizations of veterinarians, animal rights advocates,
humane societies, and the public. However, there was strong opposition from industries involved
in animal use, including agricultural, hunting, fur, and research industries. The bill that
succeeded, Bill S-203, was implemented in 2008. This bill raised the penalties associated with
the existing cruelty provisions while not making any substantial amendments to the provisions
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themselves. While widely opposed by the organizations of veterinarians, animal rights advocates,
humane societies, and the public, the bill received support from an array of industries involved in
the use of animals.170 It seems that economic actors have had more significant influence on
Canadian anti-cruelty legislation than public attitudes. A strength of the legislative efforts in the
UK has been that they apply specifically to the use of animals in science, and not to animals in
general. This approach restricts the legislative impact to members of scientific industries
involved in animal use, reducing the likelihood of such widespread opposition that Canada has
received during efforts to amend anti-cruelty laws.
iv. Key Points from this Comparative Analysis
The regulations set out by UK legislation and those of the CCAC have many similarities,
in theory, promoting adherence to the principles of replacement, reduction, and refinement. In
practice, the regulatory systems function very differently. The level of transparency in the UK is
substantial compared to the secrecy of the Canadian system. This transparency largely stems
from a comprehensive review of the regulations on scientific uses of animals in collaboration
with industry, government, animal welfare experts, and the public in Europe. No review of this
magnitude has been conducted in Canada.
It seems that academic publications and changing attitudes have been important
mechanisms for bringing the status of regulations on animal use to be reviewed. The degree of
public awareness and opposition to scientific animal procedures tend to be correlated with the
strength of regulatory responses. The introduction of legislation in 1876 and 1986 in the UK
were characterized by times when controversial uses of animals were apparent to the public and
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generated strong opposition. In Canada, the only piece of legislation that sets out a specific
regulatory system for overseeing the use of animals in science was introduced in Ontario shortly
after there were charges of cruelty against researchers at an Ontario university for conducting a
controversial baboon study. The first regulatory system for scientific animal use established in
Canada, however, was characterized by a time of strong secrecy in the industry and a lack of
controversial procedures coming to public attention. The resulting regulatory system, the CCAC,
has a structure that is considerably less strict than the structure of the UK regulatory system.
Attempts have been made to amend the anti-cruelty provisions of Canadian criminal law,
but these have largely failed. An important element of this trend is that one of the most important
proposed amendments – changing the classification of animals from being property – has an
impact on all animal use industries, not just the scientific industry. Thus, these attempts have
been met with opposition from many economic actors. In the UK, however, legislative efforts
have been coordinated with a specific focus on scientific uses of animals, reducing the amount of
economic actors affected by the legislation.
The UK system of regulation promotes transparency, accountability, and protection of
animals in science in ways that are more aligned with the moral considerations discussed above,
and that the Canadian system needs to adopt. However, the UK system also elicits some
concerns. The current UK bans on using animals in science are limited, and it is not clear
whether the harm-benefit analysis is conducted as a simple utilitarian calculus or if it is more
aligned with the deontological approach discussed herein. The system also does not necessarily
work toward eliminating scientific animal use. In the Netherlands, another approach has been
developed that aims to overcome such problems.
The Netherlands
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The Netherlands National Committee for the protection of animals used for scientific
purposes (NCad) has been appointed to protect animals that are used in scientific and educational
contexts. A previous State Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Netherlands, Martijn van Dam,
developed a goal for the country to become an international leader in laboratory innovation
without the use of animals by the year 2025. In 2016, he requested that the NCad develop a
transition plan for the replacement of scientific uses of animals. The NCad has developed a plan,
outlining the objectives, strategy, and management of the transition.171 This approach has a clear
alignment with the importance of eliminating scientific animal use mentioned previously and it
will be reviewed below as it provides additional support for eliminating scientific animal use,
and because it can serve as a guide for Canada to become more aligned with the moral
considerations discussed earlier.
i. Objectives
The transition plan presents objectives that are “both ambitious and realistically
achievable,” acknowledging that animal research cannot be eliminated in all fields by 2025.172
Five main goals are set forth pertaining to different areas of focus. The first refers to the practice
of performing regulatory tests on animals to determine the safety of chemicals, food ingredients,
pesticides, and veterinary medicines. Referring to the availability of innovative, non-animal
procedures to analyze the safety of these types of products, the opinion of the NCad is that all
animal testing under these categories can be completely replaced by non-animal methods by
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2025. Moreover, they strongly expect that this transition would improve the reliability of safety
testing.173
The second area of focus involves regulatory testing in the case of vaccines and other
biological products. Similarly, the position on this topic is that the use of animals can be
eliminated by 2025 due to the availability of alternative testing methods. Additionally, it is held
that in cases where products are developed under consistent production methods and have
previously been tested and approved for use, there should be no requirement to conduct animal
testing on subsequent productions.174
Third is the area of fundamental scientific research. Being a more complicated area for
replacing the use of animals, the view is that it is not realistically possible to phase out all uses of
animals in this area by 2025. Due to the breadth of this category, a case-by-case approach is
presented for the development of specific goals over a ten-year period. This approach involves
the various scientific disciplines, individually or in clusters, constructing transition plans that are
tailored to their fields. In addition to researchers and innovators from the appropriate fields, these
plans are to be constructed in collaboration with organizations involved in patient and animal
welfare. The result should be a transition plan that outlines clear objectives, how knowledge will
be developed and shared, the potential for non-animal innovations to apply to their field, and
how these innovations will be incorporated.175
The fourth objective is for the Netherlands to be an international leader in the
development of innovations that replace the use of animals in science. This objective identifies
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that the progression of such alternatives should be occurring more rapidly. A recommendation is
made for a more significant focus on the development of alternative methods, particularly on the
process of ideas being implemented as accepted practices. Emphasis is placed on the importance
of collaboration between disciplines and sectors.176
The final objective refers to education and training in biomedical research and veterinary
medicine. The position is that the use of animals can be significantly reduced by 2025. Although
it is expected that training in the final levels of veterinary medicine will continue to require the
use of animals beyond 2025, the plentiful non-animal teaching methods available suggest that
lower levels of veterinary training and other fields of biomedical education can operate without
the use of animals.177
ii. Strategy
This section of the transition plan outlines how to expedite the transition away from
animal methods in science. A particularly important aspect of this effort is to facilitate the
development of non-animal innovations from conception to implementation through investment
in the validation process. An approach suggested in the strategy is to develop a graduated
funding process that splits funding between early development stages and validation stages. In
the latter context, priority should be given to innovations that show a higher degree of promise in
being readily applicable.178
The strategy also recognizes importance in promoting the validity of non-animal methods
at the level of international risk assessment requirements. A variety of products are legally
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required at an international level to be tested on animals to determine their safety. With the
development of non-animal innovations in recent years there has been an international movement
to adjust these regulations in order for the implementation of new technologies that can provide
improved risk assessment. The NCad suggests starting this transition by advocating for the
implementation of new technologies alongside conventional animal methods, expecting that this
approach will lead to animal methods being deemed less reliable and ultimately unnecessary.
The importance of international collaboration is stressed.179
The strategy recognizes the value of human applications. Considering the optimal value
of conducting studies for human benefit on human models rather than other animal models, the
NCad proposes that results of research conducted on humans should be better utilized. Although
virtual human models have current applications and very promising future applications, there is
value in developing more research with human subjects than is currently pursued. Investigation
into possible advancements in human research methods that provide meaningful results without
being unethically invasive is advised.180
The final element of the strategy involves transparency in the process. Oversight and
assessment of the progress made under the transition plan is important for optimizing the
continued application of efforts to the objectives. It is proposed that data be collected on all uses
of animals in science and the progress made in developing non-animal innovations, and that this
information be made publicly available.181
iii. Management
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The NCad holds that the transition away from using animals in science must be managed,
as it will not occur on its own. It is recognized that there are many stakeholders involved in the
transition away from animal methods. There is a need for the efforts of the involved parties to be
coordinated to facilitate the transition. The NCad suggests that the central government institution
that oversees the industry of scientific animal use is the only institution capable of taking on the
role of managing the coordination between the involved parties.182
Another level of management is suggested through the development of an institution that
manages collaboration between departments. The collaboration fostered through this institution
aims to link developing policies on the use of animals to policies in areas of medicine, science,
and the environment. The intended effect is to stimulate policy change in other areas, such as
social responsibility of corporations, in ways that may facilitate the transition plan.183
In order to hold the involved parties accountable to the transition plan, the NCad suggests
developing a further agenda within the plan. This agenda would consist of the objectives of the
transition plan and, as underlined in the third objective, the individualized transition plans
developed for each specific field of research. The agenda is then to contain an agreement where
any industries, organizations, or other institutions involved in policy domains relating to the use
of animals in science are to agree to the objectives set forth in the agenda.184
Finally, the management institutions are to have an international function. The NCad
suggests that the Netherlands use their institutions and progress to promote their efforts across
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the globe. A list of recommendations for specific forms of influence and collaboration are
provided.185
iv. Comparing the Netherlands and Canada
Similar to Canada, protections for animals afforded by the central government originated
under criminal law in the Netherlands. Introduced in 1886, the protections were minimal and
based on the repercussions that humans experienced from harm inflicted on animals.186 In 1977,
with changing attitudes toward the needs for protecting the health of animals, the Experiments on
Animals Act was introduced in the Netherlands. Four years later, in response to strong opposition
from animal advocacy groups, the Dutch government enacted a declaration recognizing animals
as having intrinsic value.187 The system for regulating the use of animals in science today is still
grounded in the Experiments on Animals Act and involves a central agency that is responsible for
the licensing and oversight of animal procedures.188
An important difference between the history of animal protections in Canada and the
Netherlands is the latter having success in classifying animals as having intrinsic value. This
classification recognizes animals as mattering for their own sake – having interests that matter to
themselves. The Canadian system lacks this classification and views animals as objects,
suggesting that they matter only as far as they matter to humans – their value is derived from the
utility they offer. A possible explanation for why the Netherlands found success in this case is
due to their political system promoting engagement and discussion between stakeholders,

185. Ibid., 27-9.
186. Eugénie C. de Bordes, “Animal protection legislation in the Netherlands: past and present,” in The Humananimal Relationship: Forever and a Day, eds. Francien Henriëtte de Jonge and Ruud van den Bos (Assen: Royal Van
Gorcum BV, 2005), 201.
187. Ibid., 206.
188. NCad, Transition to non-animal research, 8.
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whereas the Canadian attempts to reclassify animals have been characterized by strong
competition of interests.189 More recently, the development of the central licensing agency in the
Netherlands resulted from European Union Directive 2010/63/EU, as did the development of the
NCad from whom the transition plan was produced.190 Thus, these organizations have resulted
from a strong international pressure that is not present in Canada. The influence of changing
attitudes in times of academic publications on animal ethics seems to remain present in the
history of the Netherlands animal protection legislation.191 The development of the transition
report has been similarly influenced, with Martijn van Dam directly citing a think tank in his
reasoning for requesting the NCad to develop the plan.192 There are differences between the
Netherlands and Canada, such as the collaborative nature between stakeholders in the
Netherlands, that may require Canada to approach phasing out animal use in science differently
than proposed in the NCad transition plan which involves close collaboration across industries
and other interest groups. However, the transition plan retains value as a guiding framework for
how Canada can approach the phasing out of animal use in science, including the need for
coordinated international efforts to which Canada should contribute.
What Canada Can Learn from the UK and the Netherlands
The UK system of regulation constitutes an effective framework for applying a strong
harm reduction approach to regulating the use of animals in science while such practices
continue, and includes a harm-benefit analysis that sets a foundation for employing a Brennan-

189. Ibid., 27.
190. Biomedical Primate Research Centre, “Dutch Experiments on Animals Act,” www.bprc.nl.
191. The implementation of the Experiments on Animals Act and the declaration of animals as having inherent
value were influenced by advocate groups when animal ethics was developing as a distinct field, shortly following
Peter Singer’s publication of Animal Liberation.
192. NCad, Transition to non-animal research, 11.
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type weighing of duties to determine our proper duties to the animals used in science. The
transition plan developed in the Netherlands provides a guide for utilizing this framework to
better restrict animal procedures in the short term, while developing a system that will phase out
most, if not all, animal testing over a longer period. If applied effectively, these systems taken
together have the potential to form a system for regulating the use of animals in science that
reduces suffering and works toward fulfilling our duties to these animals.
i. Establish a Federal Regulatory System
A core element of the UK and Netherlands systems involve mandatory licensing for all
scientific procedures involving animals with licensing, monitoring, and enforcement controlled
by the central government in a transparent system. This approach promotes transparency and
accountability by requiring that all scientific uses of animals are recorded and made publicly
available. The current Canadian regulatory system, the CCAC, does not support having a higher
degree of transparency.193 Further, considering the members who compose the animal care
committees under the CCAC system, the members who form the CCAC itself, and the financial
dependency of the CCAC on the continued operation of the facilities that they oversee, a
transition of regulatory power to a federal agency would present an opportunity to shift the
ethical evaluation of projects and the enforcement of regulations to a less biased system.
Another essential feature of the regulatory systems in the Netherlands and the UK is their
grounding in legislation. The limited effectiveness of the CCAC to enforce regulations is not
only due to their systemic bias, but also due to the absence of any legislative power to respond to
violations. Grounding a federal regulatory system in legislation is an important element to make

193. Bisgould, Animals and the Law, 212.
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the system binding on the facilities that it oversees. The Canadian federal government can
establish this legislative grounding through the criminal law power by developing a section in the
Criminal Code that pertains specifically to the use of animals for scientific purposes. By
proposing the development of a section that pertains specifically to the use of animals in science,
opposition from other animal use industries may be minimized. Such a section should be
modeled after the UK legislation, including a classification of “animal” that affords protection to
non-human animals for their own sake.194 Moreover, this regulatory system should employ a
harm-benefit analysis that weighs our duties to humans against our duties to other animals in the
context of scientific animal use according to the Brennan-type framework set out above in order
to meet, or at least to better uphold, our moral duties to non-human animals.
ii. Develop a Transition Plan
After successfully developing a regulatory system that is grounded in legislation and
enforced by the federal government, an important next step for the Canadian regulatory system
would be to develop a transition plan for phasing out the use of animals in science. Modeled after
that of the Netherlands, a Canadian transition plan should outline clear objectives for phasing out
all possible uses of animals in a clearly defined period while developing a framework that will
continue to promote the elimination of all uses of animals in science beyond this period. The
approach, like that of the Netherlands, should include contributing to international efforts to
promote the acceptance of non-animal methods under international testing regulations.195 Such a

194. This would not solve the issue of animals being classified as property in areas outside of scientific
procedures, but changing the classification exclusively in this proposed new section of criminal law aims to make
the approach more practical, recognizing the widespread opposition from economic actors in past attempts to
reclassify animals in a general sense.
195. Institutions such as the CCAAM and its subsidiary, the CaCVAM, with their goals of expediting the
replacement of animal methods through development and validation of non-animal innovations, should have an
essential role in the development and implementation of such a plan.
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system would make Canada an international leader in the realm of animal ethics by creating
regulatory institutions that work at the national and international levels to fulfill our duties to
non-human animals.
Why Should Canada Act?
The primary motivation for Canada to develop a better system for regulating the use of
animals in science should be to fulfill our duties to animals that are used in scientific procedures.
However, the inability of non-human animals to engage in our political structures results in an
underrepresentation of our moral obligations to them in the political realm.196 Even though the
political operations of Canadian society are largely anthropocentric, this does not mean the
efforts to improve moral attitudes toward non-human animals are hopeless. It has been seen that
humans have recognized a need to update how the moral status of non-human animals is
represented in legal structures, and we have applied political pressure for this purpose with some
success.197 Further, there are anthropocentric motivations that promote a need to restructure the
regulatory system of scientific animal procedures in Canada in a way that is consistent with
fulfilling our moral obligations to animals.
Transparency and accountability are important values in a democratic society. Regardless
of the implications for animals used in science, the processes of the scientific animal use industry
should be apparent to the public and effectively held accountable to the regulations set in place.
This is especially important in Canada considering the role of public funding in the form of

196. The exploitation of non-human animals for human benefit has been a part of Canadian culture for
generations. The interests of economic actors expressed within polity have been largely successful in impeding
political progress for the moral status of animals, maintaining their exploitation for, often trivial, human benefit.
See: Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, 2-5.
197. Ibid., 1-2.
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research grants for many animal procedures, and the wide-reaching consumption of products
tested on animals, such as cosmetics, household products, and medicines, by the public.
Members of Canadian society should be able to clearly know what is involved in the production
of the products that they consume, and they should be confident that producers are effectively
held accountable to the regulations of the industry. This is not the case under the current CCAC
system of regulation.
Another anthropocentric motivation to expedite the elimination of animal use in science,
a key element of the Netherlands transition plan, is to improve the quality and efficiency of
scientific inquiry.198 Animal trials for medicine development are unreliable; Ninety-five per cent
of drugs that are deemed suitable to proceed from animal trials to clinical trials in humans are
unsuccessful at the latter stage.199 There are also potential occurrences of treatments that are
successful in humans being overlooked due to failure in inaccurate animal models.200 Safety
testing procedures conducted on animals also largely fail, lacking reliability in their
predictiveness of the human and environmental impacts of chemicals.201 The continued
acceptance and utilization of animal methods in science seems to be based on convention more
than scientific validation.202 Non-animal methods work to provide relatively fast, inexpensive,

198. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has previously announced a need to replace conventional
animal methods due to their general unreliability: Food and Drug Administration, Challenge and Opportunity on
the Critical Path to New Medical Products (March 2004), 20. See also: NCad, Transition to non-animal research, 23.
199. John Arrowsmith, “A Decade of Change,” Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 11, no. 1 (January 2012): 17. See
also: University of Windsor, “Welcome to CCAAM / CaCVAM,” www.uwindsor.ca.
200. It is not clear how common this occurrence is, as failures in animal models typically do not proceed to
human trials. See: Sorenson, About Canada: Animal Rights, 145; American Anti-Vivisection Society, “Scientific
Problems,” www.aavs.org.
201. University of Windsor, “Welcome to CCAAM / CaCVAM,” www.uwindsor.ca.
202. Thomas Hartung, “Food for Thought… On Animals Tests,” ALTEX 25 (January 2008): 7.
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and reliable approaches to scientific inquiry and should replace animal methods as quickly as
possible to improve the quality and efficiency of scientific inquiry.203
CHAPTER 3
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ELIMINATING SCIENTIFIC ANIMAL USE
Costs & Benefits of the Transition
The changes proposed herein would have significant impacts on the Canadian scientific
animal use industry. The impacts of the resultant changes to industrial practices would have
financial, welfare, and environmental dimensions. This section explores the costs and benefits to
be expected under the proposed transition, how they support or challenge the transition, and how
any challenges can be alleviated to aide in successfully implementing the transition.
i. The With and Without Principle
A common approach to cost-benefit analysis involves considering the costs and benefits
that are expected to occur with the implementation of a certain set of conditions, and those that
are expected to occur without implementing those conditions.204 Various costs and benefits that
would be expected to be present with and without the elimination of scientific animal procedures
will be considered below.
a. Financial costs

203. The use of human models supports faster development of medicines under more reliable testing,
increased safety levels, and improvements in the identification of drugs that are successful in humans despite
beings harmful to certain other animals. See: Sorenson, About Canada: Animal Rights, 145-6; NCad, Transition to
non-animal research, 36.
204. Ronald C. Griffin, “The Fundamental Principles of Cost-Benefit Analysis,” Water Resources Research 34, no.
8 (August 1998): 2065.
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Scientific animal procedures tend to be more expensive than non-animal alternatives. The
use of animals in scientific facilities generates numerous distinct costs as housing animals
requires considerable amounts of space, cages and enclosures, bedding, food, cleaning, and
waste disposal.205 The total cost of maintaining animals for scientific purposes is the combined
costs of purchasing the animals and maintaining them. These costs include animal acquisition,
which can be very inexpensive for some animal types or thousands of dollars per animal for
others, and the cost of labour and supplies needed to tend to the animals and the facilities.206 An
analysis of procedural costs for toxicological testing developed by the Humane Society
International, shown in table 3, outlines the cost differences between animal methods and nonanimal alternatives. The non-animal methods range from being hundreds of dollars less
expensive, to hundreds of thousands of dollars less expensive.
Type of Toxicity

Type of Test

Study Cost (USD)

Genetic Toxicity
Chromosome aberration

animal test

$30,000

in vitro test

$20,000

animal test

$22,000

in vitro test

$8,000

animal test

$32,000

in vitro test

$11,000

Draize rabbit eye test

animal test

$1,800

BCOP test

in vitro test

$1,400

animal test

$1,800

Sister chromatid exchange

Unscheduled DNA synthesis

Eye Irritatation/Corrosion

Skin Corrosion
Draize rabbit skin test

205. National Institutes of Health (NIH), Cost Analysis and Rate Setting Manual for Animal Research Facilities
(May 2000), 18; A.I.T. Walker and D.E. Stevenson, “The Cost of Building and Running Laboratory Animal Units,”
Laboratory Animals 1 (1967): 105-9.
206. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Alternatives to Animal Use in Research, Testing, and
Education (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 243.
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EpiDerm™ human skin model

in vitro test

$850

CORROSITEX® membrane barrier

in vitro test

$500

animal test

$6,000

reduction alt.

$3,000

Rat phototoxicity test

animal test

$11,500

3T3 neutral red uptake test

in vitro test

$1,300

Rat developmental toxicity test

animal test

$50,000

Rat limb bud test

in vitro test

$15,000

Rat 24-month cancer bioassay

animal test

$700,000

SHE cell transformation test

in vitro test

$22,000

Rabbit pyrogen test

animal test

$475-$990

LAL / Endosafe-IPT

in vitro test

$83-$160

Rat uterotrophic assay (OVX)

animal test

$29,600

Subcellular receptor-binding assay

in vitro test

$7,200

Rat Hershberger assay

animal test

$37,000

Subcellular receptor-binding assay

in vitro test

$7,300

Skin Sensitisation
Guinea pig maximisation test
Local lymph node assay (LLNA)

Phototoxicity

Embryotoxicity

Non-genotoxic Cancer Risk

Pyrogenicity

Estrogen Hormone Interactions

Androgen Hormone Interactions

Table 3: Costs of Animal and In Vitro Toxicity Tests.207

Further costs of scientific animal procedures are incurred due to inconsistencies between
animal models and humans resulting in significant investments into research that ultimately has

207. These figures were collected in 2012, so the costs may be different today. However, there is no data on
the costs of animal methods and non-animal alternatives available that is more current. See: Humane Society
International, “Costs of Animal and Non-Animal Testing,” www.hsi.org.
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no successful human applications.208 For example, clinical trials for an HIV vaccine were
conducted for over twenty years without success before the non-human primate models were
questioned. Similarly, thirty years were invested in studying diabetes under a rodent model
before it was realized that this model was not properly applicable to humans.209 Improved
accuracy under non-animal models can further reduce costs by reducing the likelihood of
investing in unsuccessful research. In recent years, a growing number of pharmaceutical
companies have chosen to pursue non-animal methods to make their operations more efficient.210
b. Health Impacts
The time required for many animal methods can lead to chemicals being used in
marketed products before appropriate safety testing has been completed.211 The longer it takes to
conduct safety testing on manufacturing chemicals, the more consumers are at risk. Vioxx, a
painkiller for arthritis produced by Merck, is an example of this. Five years after Vioxx had been
available on the market, it was discontinued after studies revealed cardiovascular risks associated
with the drug. Within the period that it was on the market, the use of Vioxx led to many fatal
heart attacks and strokes in patients. Thousands of legal cases were brought against Merck,
costing the company billions of dollars in legal settlements.212 Untested chemicals used for
market production result in significant health risks for consumers and financial risks for

208. Frank Sams-Dodd, “Strategies to optimize the validity of disease models in the drug discovery process,”
Drug Discovery Today 11, no. 7 (April 2006): 355.
209. Aysha Akhtar, Animals and Public Health: Why Treating Animals Better is Critical to Human Welfare (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 154-5.
210. Lucy Meigs et al., “Animal Testing and its Alternatives – the Most Important Omics is Economics,” ALTEX
35, no. 3 (July 2018): 302.
211. Charlie Schmidt, “Researchers exploring faster alternatives to 2-year test for carcinogenicity,” Journal of
the National Cancer Institute 98, no. 4 (February 2006): 228.
212. Reuters, “Merck agrees to pay $830 million to settle Vioxx securities lawsuit,” www.reuters.com.
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producers. Non-animal methods can complete toxicological testing more rapidly than animal
tests, helping to reduce these risks.213
Animal methods can increase risks for consumers further by incorrectly identifying
chemicals as being safe in animals, despite being dangerous to humans.214 Alternatively, benefits
to humans can be missed if potentially beneficial products are deemed dangerous in the animals
on which they are tested. Aspirin and acetaminophen, for example, show dangerous effects in
animal trials but have proven safe and valuable in humans.215 Cyclosporine had highly variable
effects across different animals, providing little insight for human application and delaying its
acceptance.216 FK506 was almost unsuccessful due to findings of high toxicity in animal tests.217
However, these latter two products are now successfully used in organ transplants and to treat
autoimmune disease.218 More reliable methods will improve public health by better protecting
against harmful products, and better identifying beneficial ones. The complete replacement of
animal methods by non-animal innovations in toxicology has been proposed as optimal.219
Scientific animal procedures can present harms to the people who conduct them. The use
of anesthetics in confined facilities can have negative impacts on the health of lab personnel.
Regular exposure to low levels of anesthetic gases, which can be present during animal
procedures even with the proper mitigating equipment, have been associated with an increase in

213. Helena Kandárová and Silvia Letašiová, “Alternative methods in toxicology: pre-validated and validated
methods,” Interdisciplinary Toxicology 4, no. 3 (September 2011): 112.
214. Fanny K. Ennever and Lester B. Lave, “Implications of the lack of accuracy of the lifetime rodent bioassay
for predicting human carcinogenicity,” Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 38, no. 1 (August 2003): 52.
215. Thomas Hartung, “Per aspirin ad astra…,” ATLA 37, no. 2 (December 2009): 45-6.
216. David J. Cohen et al., “Cyclosporine: A New Immunosuppressive Agent for Organ Transplantation,” Annals
of Internal Medicine 101, no. 5 (Novemer 1984): 669-70.
217. R.Y. Calne et al., “Rapamycin for immunosuppression in organ allografting,” The Lancet 2, no. 8656 (July
1989): 227.
218. Akhtar, Animals and Public Health, 155.
219. National Research Council, Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century, 60.
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neurological and reproductive damage, toxicity of the liver and kidneys, and abnormal tissue
growth.220 Lab personnel are also at risk of developing infections from animals that are carrying
disease.221 Infections can be acquired by coming into contact with infected animals or
contaminated equipment, or through airborne transmission of the virus or bacteria.222 Infections
of this type occur at a rate of 0.45 per cent, and can be fatal.223 The increased risks of negative
health impacts under scientific animal procedures can place costs on the healthcare industry.
These risks and the associated costs can be reduced under non-animal scientific procedures.
c. Demand Impacts
The lack of transparency and government monitoring in the Canadian scientific animal
use industry results in an absence of data on the size and value of the associated sectors, making
analysis of these sectors considerably speculative. Though the value is unclear for Canadian
industries involved in breeding, veterinary care, and production of food, housing, and equipment
for scientific animal procedures, demand would be lost in these markets with the phasing out of
scientific animal procedures. However, the replacement of scientific animal procedures with
non-animal alternative methods would contribute to growth in other markets occurring
simultaneously with losses in demand in markets that depend on the use of animals in science.
The growing use of non-animal methods would generate a potential for growth in the technology
industries responsible for producing non-animal alternative technologies.

220. Jennifer C. Smith and Brad Bolon, “Atmospheric Waste Isoflurane Concentrations Using Conventional
Equipment and Rat Anesthesia Protocols,” Contemporary Topics in Laboratory Animal Science 41, no. 2 (March
2002): 10.
221. Katherine Groff et al., “Review of Evidence of Environmental Impacts of Animal Research and Testing,”
Environments 1, no. 1(June 2014): 22.
222. James G. Fox et al., Laboratory Animal Medicine: 2nd Edition (Waltham: Academic Press, 2002), 1060.
223. Determined in a study of US facilities. Benjamin J. Weigler et al., “A national survey of laboratory animal
workers concerning occupational risks for zoonotic diseases,” Comparative Medicine 55, no. 2 (April 2005): 183.
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d. Social Costs
Knowledge of the suffering experienced by animals used in science constitutes a cost
borne by members of society. Consumers who have an interest in animal welfare are made
worse-off if they are aware that the products they consume involve invasive use of animals. As
attitudes change and interests in animal welfare become stronger, this social cost becomes higher
making scientific animal procedures more costly to a society. The extent of this social cost can
be approximated by measuring consumers’ willingness to pay for products that do not involve
animal use.224 Limited research has been conducted on Canadians’ willingness to pay for goods
that do not involve animal use. One survey found that, on average, Canadians are willing to pay
an additional $13.49 per $100 on products that are guaranteed to be ethically produced.
However, the definition of ethically produced did not only include being free of harm to animals,
but also being free of sweatshop and child labour.225 Despite a lack of clear information on the
preferences of Canadians to avoid products that involve animal use, it can be expected that
animal use in science generates a social cost that can be eliminated with the transition to nonanimal procedures.
e. Animal suffering
The greatest cost of scientific animal use is borne by the animals themselves. It is very
difficult to attribute a value to the cost of suffering experienced by animals in science for various
reasons. Namely, the nature and extent of suffering varies widely across different procedures,

224. Willingness to pay is a concept used in economics suggesting that a society’s value for a good can be
measured as the aggregate amount that members of a society are willing to pay for that good. See: Jennifer
Fearing and Gaverick Matheny, “The Role of Economics in Achieving Welfare Gains for Animals,” in The State of
Animals IV: 2007, eds. Deborah J. Salem and Andrew N. Rowan (Washington: Humane Society Press, 2007), 165.
225. This cannot be taken as an accurate representation of the willingness to pay for avoiding harm to animals
due to the conflicting variables of sweatshop and child labour. See: Abacus Data, Ethical Consumerism and
Canadians, 8. www.abacusdata.ca.
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and non-human animals cannot directly communicate to humans their preferences for avoiding
being used in scientific procedures. Nonetheless, the aversion of animals to painful stimuli and
the negative psychological impacts from the conditions to which the animals are exposed are
often clear indicators of the high cost borne by these animals. The preferences of non-human
animals to avoid being used in scientific procedures are not captured by our economic structures
due to their inability to participate in these structures.226 However, the cost of animal suffering
cannot be overlooked, and should be recognized as the highest cost of scientific animal use.
f. Summary of Costs and Benefits
The opportunity cost of continuing to use animal methods in science is very high.
Scientific animal procedures tend to be more expensive than non-animal alternatives. The
continued use of animal methods would be associated with higher procedural costs for firms than
the use of non-animal methods. In the case of health impacts, the relatively long time required by
animal procedures generates a health risk for humans due to the delay of proper safety testing of
marketed substances. Non-animal methods can conduct safety testing more quickly, and would
improve the accuracy of developing new medicines by providing more suitable models for
human application than can be provided by animals. The improved medical knowledge
associated with non-animal alternatives would help to alleviate costs borne by producers, the
public, and the healthcare system by improving product safety and better identifying new
medicines. Social costs borne by consumers with an interest in animal welfare who are aware of
invasive animal procedures would be eliminated if those animal procedures are replaced. Finally,
the cost of suffering borne by animals, though not captured in our economic structures, is the

226. Fearing and Matheny, “The Role of Economics in Achieving Welfare Gains for Animals,” 162.
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highest cost involved and can be eliminated if scientific animal procedures are replaced by nonanimal alternatives. Continued support for animal procedures will slow the advancement of nonanimal innovations that are relatively fast, inexpensive, safe, and make humans and other
animals better off.227
ii. The Problem of Externalities
Externalities are costs or benefits that are not contained to those who produce them but
affect a wider class of people.228 Of the costs and benefits discussed above, various are
externalities generated by the scientific animal use industry. The negative health impacts borne
by the public and the healthcare system are largely externalities, though the cost of these impacts
can sometimes be shifted back to firms in the animal use industry through legal action, such as in
the case of Vioxx discussed previously. The social cost borne by consumers as a result of
scientific animal procedures is not captured by firms in the animal use industry, nor is the cost of
suffering borne by non-human animals. Thus, alleviating these costs through improving animal
welfare will provide little or no motivation for firms to eliminate scientific animal procedures.
The major source of consideration for firms will be the financial costs of operating with and
without animal methods.
Excluding the other considerations and looking solely at financial costs of operating with
and without animal procedures, it seems that firms in the scientific animal use industry would
ultimately benefit from eliminating animal methods due to the lower procedural costs of nonanimal alternatives. However, the consideration is not this simple. The transition cost associated

227. National Research Council, Animal Biotechnology: Science-Based Concerns (Washington: The National
Academies Press, 2002), 300; Aysha Akhtar, “The flaws and human harms of animal experimentation,” Cambridge
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24, no. 4 (October 2015): 415.
228. Fearing and Matheny, “The Role of Economics in Achieving Welfare Gains for Animals,” 162.
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with replacing animal procedures with non-animal alternatives must be considered. To transition
to non-animal methods, firms must purchase the equipment necessary to conduct these types of
procedures. These firms also have sunken costs in the equipment for animal procedures that they
would have to forfeit, as much of the equipment likely could not be sold or repurposed. When
factoring in these considerations, the annual operating costs may be lower for conducting nonanimal procedures, but firms would have to make significant short-term investments for the
transition. Further, costs and benefits that occur in the future tend to be discounted – that is, costs
and benefits occurring today are weighted more heavily than costs and benefits that will occur
later in time.229 Thus, the short-term transition costs are likely to be considered more strongly by
firms than the annually recurring benefits that would result from switching to non-animal
procedures. From the perspective of the firms, it may seem better to continue using the
equipment for animal procedures that they can conduct without making further investments,
rather than abandoning this equipment and investing in all new equipment. It may be possible,
however, to alleviate the transition cost for firms.
iii. Facilitating the Transition
Government support can help to alleviate the costs of implementing non-animal scientific
procedures.230 Why should this be done? After all, with the development of policy that mandates
the transition from animal methods to non-animal alternatives, the cost-benefit analysis of animal
use facilities would not matter – their transition to non-animal methods would be legally
required. However, lowering the cost of this transition for firms would help to reduce opposition
from economic actors in the scientific animal use industry, reducing the barriers to successfully

229. David J. Torgerson and James Raftery, “Discounting,” BMJ 319, no. 7214 (October 1999): 914.
230. Steven McMullen, Animals and the Economy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 137.
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implementing new policy. A possible approach for facilitating the transition to non-animal
methods would involve the use of accelerated depreciation. This approach involves shifting the
depreciation of new assets to occur more rapidly in the near future, which reduces a firm’s
taxable income in the short-term.231 Allowing accelerated depreciation could help to offset the
financial burden of acquiring the equipment necessary for scientific facilities to conduct nonanimal procedures, lowering the short-term transition cost and reducing political opposition from
the scientific animal use industry.
iv. Licensing and Research & Development for Continued Animal Procedures
Regulation of scientific animal use will continue to be necessary until all scientific
animal procedures are eliminated. Currently, the Canadian federal government spends $1.75
million each year in funding the CCAC. This amount constitutes approximately two-thirds of the
organizations funding, while approximately one-third of their funding comes from participation
fees paid by CCAC-certified facilities.232 In the UK, the regulatory system operates under a full
cost recovery program where license fees paid by individuals and establishments involved in
scientific animal procedures cover the entire operating cost of the regulatory body.233 To achieve
this in the UK, licensing fees in the 2019/2020 year were £275 for personal licenses and £826 for
establishment licenses, or approximately $470 CAD and $1400 CAD, respectively.234 Personal
license fees would be a new element in the Canadian regulatory system, but the establishment
license fee of $1,400 is relatively small compared to the current institution fees under the CCAC

231. Robert Eisner, “Accelerated Depreciation: Some Further Thoughts,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
69, no. 2 (May 1955): 285-6.
232. CCAC, Financial Report 2017-2018, 2. www.ccac.ca.
233. ASRU, Annual Report 2016, 33.
234. These Canadian dollar amounts were calculated using the 2019 average conversion rate of 1.6947 GBP to
1 CAD. ASRU, Annual Report 2018, 29; Open Financial Exchange (OFX), “Yearly Average Rates,” www.ofx.com.

82

system, varying from $2,200 – $28,600 based on the size and type of facility.235 Converting to a
cost recovery program under a federal regulatory body in Canada that is similar in structure to
the UK regulatory system would shift the cost of regulatory funding to be entirely borne by
members of the scientific animal use industry, rather than the majority of funding coming from
taxpayer dollars as is currently the case.
Research and development in the area of non-animal innovations in science is crucial for
the elimination of all scientific animal procedures. In the UK, the Home Office has provided
funding to a national institution that engages in research and development of non-animal
innovations, the National Centre for the Replacement, Refinement, and Reduction of Animals in
Research (NC3Rs). Annual reports from 2014-2016 report payments of £250,000 per year being
made to this organization.236 While there is no evidence of such payments being made in the
2017 and 2018 annual reports, the Home Office still emphasized a collaborative professional
relationship with NC3Rs during these years.237 Under the Canadian system, there is no incentive
to support this kind of research and development.238 Government investment in this area of
research and development is an important element to support the elimination of scientific animal
use. Further, there are opportunities for the federal regulatory system to be structured in a way
that promotes scientific animal use facilities to invest in research and development of non-animal
methods.

235. CCAC, “Program Fees,” www.ccac.ca.
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Potential for cost reduction through the development of new technologies creates
incentive for firms to invest in research and development.239 Increasing costs of scientific animal
procedures relative to non-animal alternatives increases the potential savings that can be attained
through development of non-animal scientific procedures. Strategically implementing license
fees in Canada to be tailored to the type and extent of animal use in science can be used to
increase the economic incentive of eliminating scientific animal procedures. Establishment
license fees can be structured in a way that the annual fees reflect the amount of animal
procedures conducted in a facility each year. In this way the development and implementation of
non-animal procedures would result in reduced licensing costs for facilities. Project license fees
could be introduced as well. These fees could be based on the amount of animals used in a study
and the level of invasiveness, such that projects involving animal use are increasingly expensive
with increasing numbers of animals used and levels of invasiveness. In this case, licensing fees
could further be reduced through the development of non-animal procedures, while they could
also be reduced by finding ways to lower the amount of animals used and lessen the invasiveness
of procedures that continue while non-animal alternatives are not available.
Internalizing the external costs of scientific animal use to the facilities conducting the
procedures presents another opportunity for making animal procedures more expensive to firms
relative to non-animal alternatives. Internalizing external costs involves measuring the value of
costs that are not borne by those that produce them, and imposing that value on the producers
who are responsible for bringing about those costs.240 This approach helps to make the cost of

239. Charles Hill et al., Strategic Management Theory: An Integrated Approach (Stamford: Cengage Learning,
2013), 129.
240. Neva Goodwin, “Internalizing Externalities: Making Markets and Societies Work Better,” Opinion Sur, no.
52 (December 2007): 3.
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production that is borne by a firm more accurately reflect the overall cost of production that is
borne by society. One cost that could be internalized is the social cost discussed above – the cost
borne by consumers with an interest in animal welfare who are worse-off for knowing that the
products they consume involve scientific animal use. The value of this cost can be approximately
determined through measuring consumer willingness to pay for certain products that do not
involve animal use in their production.241 After identifying the social cost of scientific animal
procedures, it could then be internalized to animal use facilities in the form of a tax. Another
external cost discussed above is the cost of animal suffering. This cost would be far more
difficult to internalize to scientific animal use facilities. The lack of ability for non-human
animals to communicate with humans or to participate in our economic structures makes it
difficult to measure the cost of their suffering. Further, any cost that could be practically applied
to capture the cost of animal suffering would surely fail to properly represent the value of their
suffering.
Environmental Impacts
The use of animals in science involves practices with environmentally harmful
dimensions. It is important to note, however, that in the overall matter of environmental
degradation, the use of animals in science constitutes a relatively minor impact. Other areas, such
as factory farming and transportation, contribute to environmental degradation far more
significantly than the use of animals in science, and areas such as these remain the most

241. Research on consumer willingness to pay for products that do not involve animal use in this case could be
conducted via survey. Since there would be no alternative products on the market that do not involve animal use
in cases where non-animal procedures are not available, analyzing market behaviour would not be viable as a
research approach. Consumers in these cases do not have options to express their preference for products that do
not involve animal use through their consumption behaviour. Rather, consumers would only have the option to
consume products involving animal use or to not participate in the market. See: Fearing and Matheny, “The Role of
Economics in Achieving Welfare Gains for Animals,” 165.
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important issues to address for environmental protection. Nonetheless, reducing environmentally
harmful practices remains an important factor associated with eliminating the use of animals in
science, regardless of the magnitude in comparison with other practices.
i. Energy Intensity
A major environmental consideration of animal labs is their consumption of energy.
Animal labs consume energy at rates up to ten times greater than other offices, per square meter
of space.242 High ventilation levels are largely responsible for energy consumption with fans
comprising 40%-50% of energy consumed. The ventilation levels, measured in air changes per
hour (ACH), are up to 20 ACH in animal facilities, while reaching up to 12 ACH in non-animal
laboratories.243 An additional 10%-30% of energy use is attributed to temperature control of the
environment and equipment.244 Other sources of energy consumption relate to protection against
outside pathogens entering the facility, and the space requirements for animal housing.245
ii. Hazardous Waste, Pollution & Contamination
Chemicals are used for a wide variety of operations in animal laboratories, such as
sanitation, providing treatment to animals, and conducting studies.246 Laboratory procedures in
general involve using chemicals that may be irritant, corrosive, asphyxiant, neurotoxic,
reproductively toxic, developmentally toxic, or carcinogenic.247 However, chemicals tend to be

242. Steven Cubitt and Gordon Sharp, “Maintaining quality and reducing energy in research animal facilities,”
Animal Technology and Welfare (August 2011): 92.
243. Ibid., 94.
244. Ibid., 92.
245. Scott D. Reynolds and Eric D. Joesten, “Green and lean: Methods of improving lab animal room
ventilation,” ALN 31 (December 2018).
246. Groff et al., “Review of Evidence of Environmental Impacts of Animal Research and Testing,” 17.
247. National Research Council, Prudent Practices in the Laboratory: Handling and Management of Chemical
Hazards (Washington: The National Academies Press, 2011), 60-4.

86

used in particularly high doses when administered to animals in toxicology tests.248 The harmful
chemicals ingested by animals can become present in their waste, bedding, and feed.249
Scientific animal facilities produce a lot of waste.250 Included in this waste are animal
carcasses that may host harmful chemicals, viruses, or bacteria, depending on the conditions they
were exposed to as study subjects. Included are also animal excreta, bedding, and feed as
previously mentioned, as well as other laboratory equipment that is contaminated from contact
with hazardous materials or contaminated animals.251 Incineration is a preferred method for
disposing of contaminated carcasses, bedding, and feed.252 Incineration, in general, has been
identified as harmful to the environment and human health due to emitting harmful pollutants,
including carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, heavy metals, dioxins and furans, nitrogen
oxides, and sulphur dioxide.253 The incineration of animal carcasses has been associated with
higher metal emissions than incineration of other medical waste.254 Another study on polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), a class of particles that can have toxic or carcinogenic effects,
found these particles to be more concentrated in emissions from animal carcass incineration than
other medical waste incineration, varying from 1.4 – 7.6 times more concentrated in animal

248. National Research Council, Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century, 40.
249. Office of Laboratory Animal Welfare (OLAW), Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee Guidebook
(Bethesda: National Institutes of Health, 2002), 141.
250. Ibid., 48.
251. Groff et al., “Review of Evidence of Environmental Impacts of Animal Research and Testing,” 18.
252. National Research Council, Prudent Practices in the Laboratory, 207; OLAW, Institutional Animal Care and
Use Committee Guidebook, 141.
253. Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Canada-Wide Standards for Dioxins and Furans
(Winnipeg, 2001), 6; Michelle Allsopp et al., Incineration and human health (Exeter: Greenpeace Research
Laboratories, 2001), 42; Michela Franchini et al., “Health effects of exposure to waste incinerator emissions: a
review of epidemiological studies,” Annali dell'Istituto Superiore di Sanità 40, no. 1 (2004): 102; Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration (CISWI) Emission Limit Calculations for
Existing and New Sources for Reconsideration Proposal (Eastern Research Group, 2011), 1.
254. Shui-Jen Chen et al., “Emissions of heavy metals from animal carcass incinerators in Taiwan,”
Chemosphere 55, no. 9 (2004): 1197.
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carcass emissions.255 A main form of exposure of humans to PAHs is through food, due to the
settling of these particles on crops.256
The dioxins and heavy metals produced from incineration of scientific animal waste
contribute to soil and vegetation contamination. Dioxins in plants and soil vary based on their
proximity to incineration sites with higher concentrations of dioxins occurring closer to those
sites. Similarly, atmospheric heavy metals from incineration can be deposited in soil and can
build up in plants, creating risks for other animals.257 Water contamination can result as well,
with heavy metals settling in water sources from atmospheric concentrations or from wastewater
produced by cleaning incinerator equipment.258 Additionally, runoff from contaminated animal
waste can contaminate surface water and groundwater.259 This presents a risk for the chemicals
used in animal labs to enter drinking water, due to the limitations of water treatment plants to
completely remove chemicals from drinking water sources.260
iii. Biodiversity
Capturing animals from the wild for use in animal research can present threats to
biodiversity. In 2008, Ardith Eudey acknowledged that long-tailed macaque populations were
rapidly declining in the wild, citing the international trade of these primates for use in science as

255. World Health Organization (WHO), Air Quality Guidelines for Europe, 2nd Edition (Copenhagen: WHO
Regional Publications, 2000), 92; Shui-Jen Chen et al., “Emission of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons from animal
carcass incinerators,” Science of the Total Environment 313, no. 1 (2003): 61.
256. WHO, Air Quality Guidelines for Europe, 92.
257. Allsopp et al., Incineration and human health, 38-9.
258. Ibid., 39, 52.
259. OLAW, Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee Guidebook, 20.
260. Paul E. Stackelberg et al., “Persistence of pharmaceutical compounds and other organic wastewater
contaminants in a conventional drinking-water-treatment plant,” Science of the Total Environment 329 (March
2004): 99-100.
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a source of the issue.261 In 2013, over 91% of the primates imported to the US were of this
species. As a percentage of all primates imported to the US that year, less than 3% were reported
as being captured from the wild.262 However, it seems that the supply of primates at licensed
breeding facilities have been supplemented with illegally caught primates from the wild, so this
proportion may be understated.263 The data on imported primates in Canada is not as detailed,
but 4,805 nonhuman primates were reported as being used in science by the CCAC in 2019, and
3,122 primates were imported to Canada in the same year.264
A further potential risk to biodiversity is presented by the use of genetically modified
animals in science. Concerns have been raised about the possibility of a genetically modified
animal escaping from a facility and breeding with populations in the wild, possibly causing
harmful disruption to the ecosystem to which that population belongs.265 Specific strategies for
containment have been presented to minimize such risk.266
Conclusion
Humans have an obligation to eliminate scientific animal procedures where the inflicted
harms are not justifiable. If there are cases where the infliction of harms on animals used for
scientific purposes are permissible, we should aim to replace such practices to reduce suffering
and fulfill our duties to those animals. Canada’s current regulatory system for the use of animals
in science fails to meet our moral duties. To improve, Canada should develop a federal

261. Ardith A. Eudey, “The Crab-Eating Macaque (Macaca fascicularis): Widespread and rapidly declining,”
Primate Conservation 23, no. 1 (2008): 129.
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264. CCAC, CCAC Animal Data Report 2019, 4; Statistics Canada, “Imports – Live Animals,” www.statcan.gc.ca.
265. Melvin B. Dennis, “Welfare issues of genetically modified animals,” ILAR 43, no. 2 (January 2002): 106.
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regulatory system for the use of animals in science – modeled after the UK system – that
promotes research and development of non-animal scientific innovations and mandates the
replacement of animal methods when such innovations are developed and validated.
Additionally, the regulatory system should employ a harm-benefit analysis that operates
according to the Brennan-type framework for weighing our duties to humans against our duties
to other animals. The federal regulatory body should also set out a transition plan – modeled
after that of the Netherlands – to guide the short-term phasing out of all replaceable and nonessential uses of animals in science, while also developing a scientific framework that works
toward complete elimination of animals in science in the long-term. The regulatory system
should be grounded in legislation to allow the regulatory body to effectively enforce standards,
and these standards should ensure that the only scientific animal procedures that continue do not
have available non-animal alternative options, are of crucial importance, and minimize the
amount of animal suffering. To reduce opposition toward a new regulatory system from
economic actors, the Government of Canada should seek to facilitate the development of nonanimal scientific facilities, such as through the use of accelerated depreciation. Eliminating the
use of animals in science through stronger regulation will promote non-animal alternative
practices that are less costly, more reliable, and less environmentally harmful within a more
transparent and accountable scientific animal use industry. Further, such a system would support
the ability of the Canadian scientific industry to meet our moral obligations and fulfill our duties
to non-human animals, making Canada an international leader in ethical scientific animal use.
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